

PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF WAR AND PEACE A PHENOMENOLOGICAL READING

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"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed". Preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO

Introduction

Philosophers and philosophy instructors in Indian universities and colleges have maintained a startling silence on the question of whether philosophers in general have a role as advocates for social issues and policy matters over the past 40–50 years. The conventional response to this question some years ago was that philosophers were uniquely qualified to analyse the meaning and logic of moral discourse, but they were not given any special privilege in making morally sound decisions. As a result, they were unable to argue for or against any social or policy issues. Philosophers today, however, are less inclined to oppose war, terrorism, violence as a tool for social change, abortion, euthanasia, and, lastly, the professional treatment of formerly marginalized social groups. This reversal can also be easily explained historically. One of the well-known immediate causes is the new generation's blatant denial that the philosophers' disinterest in social issues and problems is a professional virtue. What might happen to philosophy and its proponents—that is, philosophy teachers—in light of violent outbursts like war and terrorism in these extraordinary times?

War and Terrorism: Basic Issues

War is an activity said to be dictated by ideological considerations rather than a fit of hysteria or the desire to make a fortune. War is always completely unconventional in nature. As such, war represents a political problem and can only be tackled effectively if it is taken into account politically. The basic task of war is not to eliminate individuals, even

high-ranking ones; it is meant to intimidate society and the state. “Kill one, frighten ten thousand” is an old Chinese saying warmongers are fond of citing. We should not forget here to add that notions such as war, terror, and conflict are highly emotive terms. Now, the question is, what is war? Is war a tactical weapon in achieving a political and social upheaval? Is it mere coercion and bullying? Or is it mere violence leading to brutality and aggression? Or is it mere force thrust by certain individuals/countries upon certain other groups or countries to achieve their particular political and self-interests? Given the present world scenario, it is rather difficult to define what war is. It can first be defined as those behaviours that are horrifying and fall outside the bounds of freedom, tolerance, and respect for diversity. It is not revolutionary in character because it is not based on a scientific cognition of society but on the subjectivist, idealist and voluntarist premises through coercion, force and violence. If that is the case, then what about other terror movements like urban guerrilla movements, naxalism, freedom struggle in the form of killings and the like?

Causes and Factors of War

Hatred towards the capitalist system, social oppression, colonialist and militarist policy of imperialism, and the fear of certain countries joining a powerful group like Ukraine joining NATO are some of the factors that lead to the materialization of war. Of late, some factors are coupled with religion and religiosity, attracting the ranks of terrorist groups who are socially active and resolute: a path they have chosen to violate not only the standards of legality but also those of morality, that too in the name of religion and their gods.

Frequently, the activities of several terrorist organizations leading to war are dictated by the nationalist or religious aspirations of a group of people, like Hezbollah and Hamas. In their ideologies, national, religious and social motives are interwoven, yet one can always determine which of these are primary and predominant and which are subordinate and

attendant. Many of the groups have lately come into the habit of proclaiming themselves fighters against 'imperialist oppression'. Accordingly, these terrorist groups, whether in Gaza, Lebanon or Syria, exercise their political and religious determinations motivated by non-acceptance of the existing states of affairs with the desire to sanctify their destructive practices with their ideals.

Terrorism, War and Violence: Stages of Progression

Particularly in the past century, there have been roughly four basic phases of violence, war, and terrorism. The first phase begins with the emergence and spread of terrorist attacks in certain Latin American countries, such as Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina. It first appeared in the latter half of the 1960s. Its traits fit some of the requirements for being classified as terrorism and were connected to national liberation movements. The second stage was the emergence and spread of terrorism across industrialized capitalist nations after the wave of student riots and the dissolution of radical leftist youth organizations. This period roughly spanned the early to mid-1970s. The third stage, which started in the second half of the 1970s for most countries and coincided with a severe economic crisis in the capitalist world, saw significant changes in the leadership and makeup of terrorist organizations. The recruits were drawn to the terrorist organizations by their violent tendencies and imitativeness, which were only disguised by fictitious political motives, rather than by ideological considerations, even if those considerations were skewed, narrow-minded, and self-deceptive. The fourth stage of terrorism and its violent tactics started when the USSR was liberated from communism in the late 1980s, leaving the third world defenceless against a "big brother." These days, terrorist organizations have openly disclosed their religious ties and terrorist actions. It represents what might be called the "bomb philosophy," which embodied their actual convictions. The political and philosophical beliefs of the terrorists are essentially a medley, combining elements from different genres and

ideological movements with the universal, all-encompassing theme of singing violence.

War and Conflict: Philosophical Issues

Considering a topic like war and world peace, the way concepts like terror and peace have been handled throughout philosophy's history does not remain at the level of the factually evident. Rather, it is an indication of the potential advantages of the philosophic method. Rather than examining any specific treaty or alliance, philosophy starts its discussion of war by asking why such phenomena happen and what intellectual process they represent. In other words, the general principles and characteristics of human behaviour provide philosophy with its distinct aspect. According to Immanuel Kant, it was the war that had 'scattered men 'in all directions, even into the most inhospitable region, so that these too might be populated'(Kant, 1972, p. 156)

A philosophical analysis of war and peace begins with man. Any philosopher or thinker's position on this topic is based on a broad theory of human nature and a societal viewpoint on people's nature in their various organizations, and associations. It shifts from studying man as an individual with knowledge and actions to studying man as a member of a national and cultural group. Consequently, the focus shifted from studying human nature to analysing the societal organism in its chronological context. As a result, the topics of war and peace can only be meaningfully discussed in a context where humans are a collective group or in a society. A great thinker and philosopher like Immanuel Kant affirm that war and continuous strife are the natural state of men. He goes on to assert that even if at any given time, there are no ongoing wars and all hostilities between two people have ceased, that by itself is not a guarantee of peaceful relations. (Kant, Ibid, p. 148)

Greek Thinkers and the Issue of Conflict/ War

According to Plato, the corruption of the soul is the fundamental source of fear, conflict and war. The rise of luxury as a major economic category is a social manifestation of this internal corruption. Men are compelled to cooperate in a community of scarcity not because they are inclined to be good but rather because they must survive. However, when this archaic economy is overcome, people are distinguished by their material functioning, pretension, and luxury—not because of their inherent qualities, but rather because of the power they provide. Therefore, pursuing luxury on a material level turns into a pursuit of power, and on a psychological level, it represents the decadence of the soul. Thus, Plato contends that the love of honour and wealth is a sign of societal and personal decay. In a way, the philosopher-king's strongest defence is that only he or she can eradicate the root of fear and conflict. By definition, those who seek wealth as a goal must resort to militarism to achieve their goals, leading to wars. The only one who can cleanse society's soul and bring about peace among people is the philosopher, who is led by the pursuit of wisdom and truth.

Both Plato and Lucretius look for an impartial explanation of how conflict arises, but Lucretius adopts a different approach. He asserts that a lack of economic and technological progress is the cause of both war and terror. Plato noted that economic success and sociality were causes of conflict, but a lack of technological advancements led to extreme individualism. Peace, in Lucretius' view, is an indication that people have been "tamed". Even though technological advancement causes economic friction, he thought that the success of such a community of human interests was demonstrated by the simple biological fact that humans had survived and multiplied. A singular blend of the ancient and the contemporary, Lucretius was. The case of Epictetus illustrates the pessimism that frequently accompanies a civilization founded on the ongoing exploitation of culture and land and the repression of human dignity. Although he still hopes for a world free from conflict, he accepts

that it is a natural part of life and that men can only choose not to be bothered by it. As a result, he moves the foundation of peace from society to personal awareness. Heraclitus put forth a third and even earlier theory of causation than Plato and Lucretius. According to him, progress and industry neither cause nor prevent war or terror; rather, they are the result of nature's will at work. According to Heraclitus, conflict, war, and terror are inherent to the world. It is the strangely human manifestation of the conflict that pervades the cosmos.

Causal Relations

If fear, conflict, and war have historical roots in human consciousness, then figuring out what causal relationships are necessary to ensure a stable peace again is a philosophical question. According to one theory, eradicating socioeconomic tensions permanently is the only way to bring about peace. Another theorist might adopt a completely different approach, contending that the only way to prevent war is to use one's natural aggression positively. The causal analysis of war and terror has consistently maintained a dualistic position. Subjective or introspective elements like human restlessness, innate violent tendencies, or the spirit of adventure and heroism that can only be fully realized in combat are all associated with political idealism. Political realism stands in stark contrast, emphasizing the importance of socially and externally conditioned factors. According to this perspective, political rivalries, economic inequalities, and related problems are the main causes of conflict. These varied tendencies have been present throughout the history of philosophy. This distinction is still significant in contemporary political philosophy despite attempts to provide a relativistic compromise.

Nietzsche offers a distinct kind of causal theory. He considers the Christian conscience to be a "bad conscience." Because it turns the individual into "an adventure, a torture chamber, a hazardous and perilous desert," and this conscience does not promote social harmony.

Nietzsche is opposed to Christian morality if it is fundamentally pacific. Because it only creates external peace at the expense of personal tranquillity. According to the Genealogy of Morals, "acts of violence and nothing else" are the only things that can propel civilization forward. Thus, in political idealism, one must choose between Nietzsche's "artist egoism" and Toynbee's "contrite spirit." The pietistic saint of Toynbee is of a much lower quality than the warrior-saint of Nietzsche. Nietzsche provided a fresh definition of idealism. According to him, people will prefer short-term peace over long-term peace and use it as a pretext for starting new conflicts. Therefore, he counsels victory rather than peace. Hence, the saying 'let your peace be a victory and your labour a battle'. All things considered, political realism keeps the focus of classical philosophy on the objective reasons for harmony and conflict. The functional division of men in the economy and polity is the root cause of the process of human alienation as political realism conceptualizes it.

War and Conflict: Moral and Political Questions

Like all acts of violence in a political setting, are terrorist attacks justified? This is a moral and political question. Given the terrorist attacks committed by Hezbollah and Hamas, this question is more pertinent now than ever. On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah launched an attack on Israel, one day after Hamas raided Southern Israel. With massive Israeli strikes in Lebanon and a subsequent Israeli ground invasion, the situation turned into a full-scale war in September. More importantly, Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who supports Hamas and Hezbollah militants, demanded in a statement that Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu and his former defence chief be executed. We have good reason to think that, in the end, using terrorist violence will result in less injustice, suffering, and degradation than either not using violence at all or using it differently. Terrorist attacks are justified if they are (a) a weapon that is politically effective in the revolutionary struggle and (b) ultimately effective. In this context, terrorist acts are generally not justified, though they may be in certain

circumstances. The recent revolutionary wars in Mozambique and Angola, the Algerian revolution against France, and the South Vietnamese resistance to American invasion and occupation provide us with a compelling justification for defending these acts (of violence). The ongoing conflicts in African nations may make them justified. In these situations, at the very least, these kinds of questions become very real.

Our concerns about the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of conflict, and specifically political violence, are not based on the perspectives of the perpetrators or the victims. If they were the victim rather than the revolutionary, and they could still maintain objective reasoning in such a situation, they would still be willing to admit that the act was justified, and then any justification would have to pass the test of acceptance by rational moral agents. A moral agent must also understand that for the revolutionary act to be morally justified, if he were the victim, he must be ready to accept the rightness of the revolutionary's action in a cool moment. However, this does not imply that he or she must wish for this to happen to him. We must determine what would be acceptable to morally upright, rational agents (i.e., agents with a sense of justice) in a state of reflective equilibrium, or, to put it another way, in a situation where they are incapable of reasoning when we pose justifiable questions. This stance and argument hold that there are situations in which acts of revolutionary violence—and sometimes even terrorist acts—are morally acceptable.

Let us shift our focus to the obsession with violence in any form, such as war, conflict, or terror, as a contributing factor to revolutionary acts. We will contend that a significant degree of ideological mystification is involved in this situation. All contemporary non-primitive societies use force and coercion extensively, and violence frequently accompanies this practice. As the Harvard study group indicates, "Like Sisyphus, modern man continually pursues an unreachable objective- absolute security to find the weight of political rivalries, conflicting interests, and opposing ideologies pushing back against him. Perfect security is a goal that can

never be achieved; it can only be approached. But persisting in the effort is important because it is only through such actions that the likelihood of war can be reduced, even if the possibility of war cannot be banished altogether". (Albert Carnesale et al. 1983, p. 232)

There is no doubt that violence needs to be justified when the harm or injury it causes is unintentional. We frequently look for an explanation for why war is fought in the first place, in the very common sense of the word "justification." If there is any justification for war, it is an acknowledgement that the terms "just" and "war" are at least dubious synonyms. The idea of "just war" aims to illustrate the situations in which it would be acceptable to carry out otherwise immoral acts and to contribute to negative outcomes, since the type of destruction that conflict and war involve is typically categorized as immoral behaviour. Following Thomistic standards (St. Thomas Aquinas) and the Christian perspective on the legitimacy of war, conflict, and terror, I would like to suggest three broad requirements that are necessary for the justifiability thesis as exemplified by Donald A. Wells: (1) An authoritative sovereign must declare war, (2) A just cause is required (3) The men who wage war must have noble intentions and moderate means so that some good actually results. Furthermore, the good that results should be greater by some magnitude than the evil that must be produced by waging war. In the application of these criteria, few criticisms of war emerged, suggesting that Princes were remarkably wise and beneficent or else that the criteria of just war were too vague to be discriminating. (Wells, 1973, p. 125) The main idea to convey is that, while there are situations when it is justified, there are other times when it is not, and that includes using violence as a political tool to begin transforming an oppressive and unfair social structure into a respectable one that will allow for each person's free creative growth and a social order in which people can maintain their dignity. Taking the typically conservative and liberal evasion and coming to the conclusion that we must oppose violence in any form is ideologically confusing, given the reality of the situation. As Wells

argues, if rulers were saints or scholars, there might be some reason to suppose that their judgments in war were adequate and that they would not declare war for scurrilous reasons.

At least two obstacles lie in the way of such a likelihood occurring. In the first place, the permissible reasons for waging war were so inclusive that virtually any conceivable princely aim could get support. Even wars of vindictive justice were permitted. In the second place, there were no plausible reasons to suppose that secular leaders had intentions that would meet even minimal standards of humaneness. It is not necessary to have in mind leaders like Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, or Thieu to see that this is so. There is nothing like the process by which leaders are selected to give assurance that the leaders of France, England, or America have moral insights that are even as good as the average, let alone sufficiently discerning to be used as the criteria for a just war". (Ibid, p. 126) Here, a specific application of a prevalent moral dilemma is apparent. The philosophical issue we are facing here can be summed up as follows: both the political practice of killing for state purposes and the ethical ideal of not killing are dubious. The maxims are (a) the ethics of ultimate ends and (b) the ethics of responsibility, if I may use Max Weber's concept.

The Phenomenological Turn

Using a hermeneutic approach, I would like to state that war is essentially a historical practice that is "handed down" and "taken up" by successive generations. The existentialist viewpoint also asserts that my 'being' against (an Other) is the fundamental structure of war. This other person could be an insider or an outsider. We can demonstrate how the human body is ontologically dependent on war by combining these claims, which are perpetuated in the form of a soldier as a Being in space and time. Additionally, we can find that such a methodology is evident through an analysis of the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Lebanon, which leads us to scrutinize how soldiers are framed as

potentially dead entities and how Israeli and Russian soldiers are framed as skewed components of conflict. It also suggests that soldiers are treated not as subjects of the process but merely as objects to be used for war purposes. More often than not, power is in the hands of a few, leaving a vast number of people powerless and treating the soldiers as objects to assert the goals and interests of the State. This amounts to the danger that soldiers are ‘collective subjects’ where the very subjectivity of the human subject is in danger. War is the strongest way of human oppression, and as Camus states, human oppression must be rejected and condemned by all, without excuse or qualification. It indicates that in the field of war studies, phenomenology is a framework for understanding and assessing war as experienced.

The original focus of phenomenology was centred on consciousness as a framework for deliberate experiences. Nevertheless, it evolves into a comprehensive theory of individual experience and lifeworld as the tangible setting of such experience throughout Husserl's research. (J. Brudzińska, Vol. XXVI, No. 3/2016) Conflict, war and terrorism cannot and should not be understood as an extra, unintentional, or merely potential aspect of experience. Instead, war and conflict offer the essential framework for any experience and thus lead towards the idea of experiential subjectivity. Let us pay attention to the phenomenological processes that symbolize, experience, and endorse war, as well as how these processes contribute to the possibility of the continuity of war in human history. War must be phenomenologically grounded as a composition of human conflicts as a way of being in the world. Thus, a fourth-century Roman officer named Vegetius left to the world its military axiom: “Si vis pacem, para bellum” If you desire peace, prepare for war. Phenomenologically understood, war, therefore, is a human activity, but paradoxically inhumane. It means that war is inherent in the human condition and hence ineradicable. Hence, war has been ironically understood as a means for social change. What is emphasized here is that war and every type of conflict are as old as human ‘civilization. Though

war is universally feared, it fascinates the human mind. Thus, we have characters like Russian President Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in human history. The glorification of military feats may also be taken into account, which somehow makes the horror, suffering, and loss of war more tolerable. The best illustration of the exaltation of war is the annual ceremonial celebration by the Indian government of the Kargil War victory over Pakistan.

The twentieth century has frequently been described as a "century of total war." The extent and severity of the suffering and destruction brought about by wars over the past century are simply incomprehensible. An ontology of war has been developed in the literature on war studies, but unless this ontology is deeply rooted in human beings—that is, in experience and action as it persists over time—there will be a tendency to hypostatize war as an external and inevitable fate. Phenomenology insists that the majority of our experiences are grounded in *natürliche Weltanschauung*, or ordinary, natural experiences. The things I encounter daily are a part of my everyday sensibilities rather than being created or abstracted. Let me give you an example. Two terms are used in the typical Indian philosophical context to mean the world: *Jagt* and *Sansar*. The world is the object to which both of these terms allude. However, precise definitions of these terms demonstrate that they have different meanings. For example, "*Jagt*" denotes an objective world, whereas "*Sansar*" denotes our subjective worlds, which are the source of the majority of our doubts, anxieties, and inner meanings and which they present as undeniable facts. All of my life has been lived and experienced here, and I have come to comprehend my life in its most authentic and fitting form. The main argument is that this experience extends beyond the information contained in conscious acts. It is my life-world. It is the horizon of meaning without which objects cannot exist; it is in the life-world in which I find food as a means to nutrition, coal as a heating material, a hammer for driving a nail, etc. These objects have meaning as objects of use in the life-world. In the life-world, we speak of water

and not H₂O; we see the colour red and not a particular wavelength, coal as a heating material, not as combustible, and so on. In the context of war, it suggests that each soldier has a lived reality that is different from the reality they live in on the battlefield. This lived world lacks ratiocination but is full of compassion and passion. It comes before all perceptions. Since the majority of a soldier's actions, particularly those related to the battlefield, are not rationally directed or controlled, the realm of experience in a battlefield cannot be regarded as an additional realm apart from the "real world" of experience. Hence, certain indispensable questions arise, which may be listed as follows: Why is war still so significant to any society/ country? Do we have some options for creating a new basis for peace in the modern world? These questions provide a philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of war and the relationship between war and the human self. This indicates that, phenomenologically, there is a relationship between war and the philosophical understanding of the "notion of subjectivity".

The Concept of Subjectivity and Phenomenology

The concept of Subjectivity is undoubtedly a serious philosophical issue from the Milesian School. Greek philosophy, in general, and Aristotle, in particular, have not considered the subject a philosophical category that belongs primarily to a human being. Instead, it is the opposite of an attribute or the predicate of a sentence. A subject such as Socrates, a dog or a stone is also a substance for Aristotle. Before the age of Descartes, the conception of the subject as a philosophical category belonging to the human being did not overshadow the general conception of substance. (Dan Zahavi, 2001, p. 335) Since the subject is thought to be at the centre of experiences, subjectivity is associated with it. Instead of emphasizing objectivity, it highlights the mental aspect of experience. This implies that the subject—the owner of experiences—is that to which the objects or contents of consciousness are presented. The existence of subjective experiences, according to some other philosophers, suggests that these are the kinds of events that take place in a private world that each subject

has all to himself, one that he is unable to share with others and to which no one else has access.

One of the topics in Cartesian philosophy is the ego, soul, or mind. They are a kind of substance, despite their differences from the latter. Extension is the essence of material substance, whereas thinking is the nature of the ego, soul, or mind. The ego in spirit is separate from and does not come from material substance. According to the Cartesian cogito, "I think, therefore I am" is its tenet. Because Descartes offered his theory of human subjectivity within the confines of his mind-body dualism, he was unable to integrate any deeper intention into his conception of humans. The capacity for awareness, responsiveness, and authorship of one's thoughts and actions are all included in the conventional definition of subjectivity.

Concerning Immanuel Kant, we understand that he developed a new understanding of the subject or self beyond Descartes and Leibniz. He developed Leibniz's reflection of apperception and considered the subject as a kind of ability or activity of synthesizing perceptual data or constructing experiential objects. This turns the Cartesian and Leibnizian substantiated subject into an a priori function of consciousness or the ground for the possibility of all knowledge. (Kant, 1997, pp. 276, 287) Kant's concept of Subjectivity is closely connected with his Copernican revolution; according to him, knowledge is possible only by supposing that objects conform to our knowledge, as reason can know only what it produces. If the subject creates what it knows, then in understanding, the subject knows what it has made. Therefore, objectivity is cognizable and transparent to the subject. The identity between the knower and the known, subject and the object, Subjectivity and objectivity, which Hegel calls the principle of speculation, runs like a red thread from the critical philosophy through the later German idealism of Schelling and Fichte.

The subject of experience, as defined by Hegel's phenomenology, is the immediate subject that ascends to consciousness via the spiritual journey.

Finally, a material becomes the subject or the absolute. Consequently, the history of Subjectivity cannot be confined to the Cartesian or Monadological cogito, which anticipates the Hegelian absolute subject; a competing understanding of Subjectivity is also provided by Locke, Berkley, and Hume's empiricist cogito. Husserl disagreed with Kant's claim that subjects, selves, or egos are things in and of themselves. According to Husserl, the terms "to the things themselves" refer to absolute evidence rather than unknowable concepts in and of themselves. As we know, this approach is known as phenomenological reduction. In the process, Husserl not only methodically reveals the subject's or ego's intentionality structure, but he also reveals the subject's givenness as a transcendental ego.

By examining the nature of human consciousness, Husserl's phenomenology reveals some special intuitions that lead to essential truths. The fundamental datum of all that is provided is consciousness. Without consciousness, the world would not hold the same meaning for us when we think about it. Since consciousness is the focus of all "making evident" and the origin of the meaning of evidence as a presentation of reality, it is the only source of certainty that could exist. Husserl's phenomenology can therefore be viewed as a science of consciousness. Phenomenology is a branch of philosophy that begins with the intuitive experience of phenomena and attempts to distil from it the substance of our experiences and the key characteristics of experiences. Based on these observations, phenomenology appears to have a deeper comprehension of the subjective and the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, where objectivity is a result or accomplishment of subjectivity. Its focus on the world-constituting consciousness is a potent counterbalance to naturalism in all of its manifestations, and it is arguably the only philosophy that has made an effort to specifically explain how the ego or self has a relationship with itself and how it experiences others in empathy.

Husserl, being the father of phenomenology, takes up an unmistakably positive attitude in asserting that “it is consciousness through and through the source of all reason and unreason, all right and wrong, all reality and illusion, all values and disvalue, all deed and misdeed”. When it comes to the body, the primary contribution of phenomenology is its recognition of the body's cooperation with consciousness. The "ontological centrality of the body" is acknowledged, with the physical body functioning in tandem with selfhood and a sense of social interactionism. The body, therefore, acts as a temporal marker, perhaps recording wounds received during a conflict or war. Here, the body is commonly "a tacit frame of reference" because the soldier's lived experiences often incorporate or indicate their presence in his body, which is a place for observation by others. The bewildering life-worlds that soldiers inhabit in a war field contradict the certainties that are commonly provided by the State actors.

Global Peace

One of the main concerns of philosophy has been world peace. It has been one of the most significant theological commodities throughout history. Experience has shown that achieving world peace inevitably results in nations living in harmony for a long time. Although it is theoretically possible, some people think that human nature precludes world peace. This belief is based on the notion that people are either inherently violent or will decide to use violence under specific conditions. However, some people hold the myth that war and violence are not inherent to human nature, which keeps people from striving for global peace. Violence and organizations that depend on the threat of violence to operate would disappear from the world if world peace is defined as the absence of animosity, violence, and conflict—not only between nations and regions but also between individuals. Since force is a form of violence, law enforcement cannot exist. The only laws that could exist without law enforcement are those that everyone freely chooses to abide by. Finally, no government could use the threat of

violence to control its citizens, enforce the law, or collect taxes. It may be construed as the recognition of objective laws even if such laws posit the necessity of combat. In such a determinist framework, man is at peace with himself insofar as he is in harmony with the flow of objective events.

The problem of the attainability of peace is primarily a tough-minded issue of theory in its most intimate relation to action. The attainability of peace is almost invariably linked to a general worldview. As Ashok Vohra claims, “Attainment of peace as a personal endowment implies a condition of inward soundness or a feeling of well-being which in turn results on (a) freedom from personal anxiety, care and foreboding with respect to the future, (b) deliverance from a perplexity of mind, (c) satisfaction of affection, and (d) the restfulness of the surrendered will. The attainment of peace helps one to overcome vanity and inner restlessness. The freedom from one’s inner conflicts is a measure of the degree of peace one has achieved”. (Ashok Vohra, 2007, p. 36) It is expressed in a general way that typically states that x can exist if a, b, and c are followed. The question of whether or not peace can be achieved is a prediction that cannot be addressed solely through empirical or descriptive means, in contrast to the problems of causality and meaning. Similarly, the wide gap between practical and ethical consciousness is to distinguish between desirability and attainability. As a result, the question of attainability can be thought of as a bridge between the desirable and the real.

The issue of attainability is, in a sense, a halfway house between the actual and the desirable. “Kant’s “Kingdom of Ends” is a community where every rational being is taken as an end in himself. This community is bereft of violence, terrorism and war because it would include only those activities which could be universalized. The practical rationality consists of acting rationally on universalizable principles. These universalized principles state that what is reason for one person must be reason for everyone else as well. It is worth pointing out that Kant holds

this version of practical rationality. According to Kant, violence, terrorism and war cannot be universalized, because universalization of these principles would result in the total annihilation of rational beings. Can we imagine a universe without rational beings? (Daniel, S. C. 2007, pp. 20-21)

The place of desirability in an analysis of peace is complicated by the fact that it calls into account problems of an essentially ethical character, that is, the problem of value. It is possible, for example, to assert that peace is extrinsically valuable in that it promotes the material welfare of civilization without believing in its attainability. In such a view, evolution through harmony may represent what is valuable or desirable, but evolution through conflict represents what is factual. This separation of the factually attainable and the ethically valuable takes place when the concept of force is conceived as an absolute good or evil apart from the consequences or causes of its use. To admit that there may exist a condition under which peace is not attainable is to forfeit the claim of the absolute worth of universal harmony. For it would reveal an incongruity, which is incompatible with the idea that the desirable is always attainable. As Sujata Miri asserts, "He (Kant) thinks that there is a postulate of pure practical reason which asserts that the noumenal reality is a moral order, ordained by God to be just. However, since the individual is to act with reference to an order, to which he belongs, but which is not successfully actualized in the phenomenal world, he may be justified in behaving in less than optimal conduct because of the bad conditions around him. He could say, for example, that one cannot be honest in a world full of cheats" (Sujata Miri, 2007, p. 28)

Peace signifies a harmonious relationship between man and the object of his desires. While nations are locked in religious conflict as it is happening today, with the superpower versus some of the Muslim world, the individual can nonetheless survive emotionally. Knowledge of the things at stake in one's religious faith may provide that inner serenity that no fundamentalist perception can injure. The identification of the

individual with the historical future or a heavenly future is that element in a philosophy (naturalistic or idealistic) that makes it not only a methodology but also a way of life for an enormous number of people.

Global Peace: Social Framework

Global peace implies the absence of aggressiveness within a family, clan or community, or to widen the circle, the organic unity of a national, linguistic or religious group. At this point, it moves beyond the individual into a social framework. Sociology and political philosophy, to the extent to which they are concerned with the issues of global peace, operate within such a framework. The anthropological approach to the peace issue suggests that we should value and accommodate the greatest variety of cultural patterns at the level of family, group, and racial relations. Conflict increases rather than decreases when social elements are controlled and manipulated in an attempt to eradicate diversity. The paradox of unity in diversity has never had greater significance than it does now, thanks to globalization and intellectual exchange. In their attempt to escape "the frightening heterogeneity of the twentieth century," the Fascists have resorted to primitivism, where there is only one unquestioned rule and no upsetting conflict or choice. The democratic solution, and one which receives every support from anthropological science, must be that of orchestrated heterogeneity”.

It might be worthwhile to reiterate that the question of world peace applies both as a goal and as a tool for preserving universal human values. It might be exaggerated to say that men can sacrifice their political freedom or financial stability to uphold their rights. Progress and world peace do not necessarily have to conflict, even though historically, the price of one is the surrender of the other. Rather, the significance of global peace should be viewed in light of the social, religious, cultural, and economic goals of humanity. When placed within the broader context of human progress, the idea of world peace can be seen as a necessary but not sentimental adjunct to further progress, and the

dogmatism that accompanies an absolute and fixed ethical system can be avoided.

An Integrated Theory of Peace

Belief in the potential success and value of such an endeavour is the first step towards developing an integrated theory of peace. Here, I suggest that four main pillars support the idea of an integrated theory of peace. First and foremost, a narrow theoretical consensus regarding the necessity of using human reason for positive purposes—that is, advancing civilization—is needed. The development and enrichment of thought and practice are contingent upon the flowering of human life, which is the second minimal concept that all perspectives assume and require. The third point is merely a rejection of those points of view that naturally view reason and the free flow of ideas as decadent; that is, philosophies that rely on force rather than reason, or on instinct rather than truth that has been determined by science. An integrated philosophy of peace acknowledges that humans are dedicated to both peace and progress, which is its fourth and most intricate component. However, when this progress is conceptualized, the human world is no more fixable than the stars in heaven.

In our day and age, the question of peace is fundamentally pragmatic. It incorporates a cooperative philosophy specifically because of this. It is the understanding that philosophy has both a public and a private domain. Philosophical disagreements mirror real-world social divisions. This area of private philosophy deals with the question of whether social practice to create the good or contemplation of the good constitutes the primary component of human dignity. It is possible to multiply examples of this distinction indefinitely. The value of human life, according to existentialists, is found in the various shocks that people experience when they interact with nature and other people. According to Thomists, the encounter of man with divine necessity is what gives life its value. The dialectical materialist may believe that a society with freedom and

abundance in terms of both material and cultural aspects is what humanity is ultimately worth. However, a fundamental consensus—namely, the value of life itself—remains despite these glaring doctrinal differences. This solid foundation is what elevates an integrated theory of peace above a metaphysical ideal.

Policy Issues

The struggle against war and conflict must be conducted along a broader front and with greater foresight than merely tracking down and arresting members of certain groups. What is needed may be enlisted as follows: (1) To deprive the war strategy of any significance and to make war ineffective in the eyes of the countries themselves. (2), War must be viewed in the ideological and political sense, i.e., all allusions concerning war must be dispelled; it must be deprived of the support of that milieu which is still sympathetic to it, and an atmosphere of general intolerance towards it must be created. (3) It is necessary to block those forces which consciously or subconsciously facilitate the development of war activities. (4), War threatens democracy, but the enforcement of the bodies of repression, the adoption of extraordinary laws and similar measures are too high a price to pay for the liquidation of terror activities, for these measures are also connected with infringements upon democracy or the rejection of it. And (5) The main condition of a successful struggle against war is the active participation of the Nation States and a meaningful and effective representation by the United Nations. In other words, the United Nations should be provided a greater role and task in world conflicts.

Conclusion

It is possible to envision what is known as "ideological and political conceptions of war" as an unattractive structure composed of two ideological layers in light of the observations that have been made. The first one appears to be a collection of particular political and philosophical concepts that were randomly selected from the most

diverse theoretical and ideological systems; it is external, oblique, unstable, and unbalanced, and it does not necessarily entail war practices as a practical outcome. Internal, radical, stable, and offering the criteria for the decision, the second one embodies what could be referred to as the war solution to their philosophy's central dilemma, which is a skewed belief in the indispensability of using armed forces to change the world. Beyond brute force and warmongering, what is required is the opening of the human spirit to provide a liberal education which will truly free the coming generation to the construction of a world social order in which people and nations can live that freedom. Ambassadors of such freedom are represented by Mother Teresa, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King or Vaclav Havel.

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