

Intersubjectivity, Intentionality, Intersectionality and Indigenous Lifeworld

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Abstract:

Intersubjectivity and intentionality, the two terms that got into the philosophical discussions through the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, trigger various analyses. Initially Husserl wrote on intentionality to explain his phenomenological approach, and Merleau-Ponty developed it further. However, the terms are discussed later by other philosophers too and are used extensively in interdisciplinary studies. This article endeavours to understand intentionality and intersubjectivity in detail, to explore the philosophical solutions for lived world problems of intersectionality with reference to these phenomenological concepts. Intersectionality is a theoretical term that has evolved in recent academics, to address the identity issues and inequalities due to various socio-cultural contexts. The life-world experiences caused by the differences in identities and subjectivities within Indigenous communities are taken as examples to substantiate the covert connection between intersubjectivity and intersectionality.

Key Words: Intentionality, Intersubjectivity, Subjectivity, Identity, Individuality, Intersectionality, Indigenous life-world.

Introduction

Subjectivity and identity have been core concepts of contemplation in modern philosophy, though we can grasp such concerns even earlier in the history of philosophy. The discernments of identity and individuality were fortified with the prominence of rationality in modern times. Initially, with Descartes and later with Kant, Hegel and following tradition, philosophers mainly thought human individuals make subjectivity and identity with rationality. The issue of conceiving the subject separate from the object was the focal philosophical approach to

define objectivity and subjectivity. In all areas such as metaphysics, epistemology and axiology, philosophers were affected by this way of thinking. The subject and the object were considered as different metaphysical entities having no connection with each other. The knowledge-making possibilities were divided into subjective and objective in an oppositional way. Ethical and aesthetical judgments were supposed to be done either subjectively or objectively. Within the dichotomies ascended from these thinking methods, there were attempts to understand identity as different from subjectivity for a long time in the modern period. Subjectivity is understood as the perspectives or conceptions an individual human mind would hold in it. According to the conceptions and subjective positions held by a human individual, an identity is being formed by himself/herself. The identity could be self-evolved or provided by other factors as per the subjective positions one would take to act upon particular instances in the world, they live in.

The dichotomy between subject and object in modern thought protracted even more deliberations on the issue of subjectivity, and that paved the path for finding intersubjectivity in the world. According to the concepts of subjectivity, the mental state of a human individual is the sole reason for any of his/her actions. If subjectivity is understood as individual mental states constituting one's own perspectives or opinions, the questions still remain about how these mental states are produced that would constitute one individual's subjectivity. If there are any other agencies or factors that would make the subjectivity of someone, or is it out of the vacuum the subjective positions grow in the minds, are problems to be addressed. Those who follow the rationalist tradition might decide the mind is having all such conceptions intuitively already to build the subjectivity. Those who follow the empiricist tradition would come into a theory that these subjective positions and the mental states behind them are arising out of experiences. This opposing standpoint of philosophers to define the mind and mental states also affects the definitions of subjectivity. We could observe the emergence of

intersubjectivity as a premise of philosophy later in phenomenology, to overcome this binary way of looking at the problem of the subject and its Other.

Intersubjectivity and intentionality are two terms that got into the philosophical discussions through the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl in the first half of the twentieth century. Husserl wrote on intersubjectivity in his *Fifth Cartesian Meditation*. In this work, he is dealing with not only the question of whether the ‘Other’ exists but also the question, ‘How is the Other given to me on the most basic level’.¹ The answer to the question is that the Other is accessible only as inaccessible, according to a huddle of intersubjectivity. It is obvious that due to this inaccessibility, I cannot understand the Other or anticipate the behaviour of the Other.² In other words, the subject cannot have full access to its object of study, and the inaccessibility is still more multifarious if it is a human individual/Other. The issue of otherness and objectivity are intertwined in phenomenology and the intersubjectivity are to understand the world we live in is a shared world where the Other is only inaccessibly accessible. Though the basics of intersubjectivity is to describe the everyday life aspects in this way, it does not intend specifically the interpersonal type of mingling. Phenomenology gives the notions of intersubjectivity as happening in the lifeworld experiences, and that makes the subject and its Other too. That means the phenomenological sense of life-world has the property of being objective and intersubjectively shared.

Husserl’s elaboration of intersubjectivity also includes the conceptualization of intentionality in his phenomenological approach, taking the term from his teacher and psychologist Franz Brentano. Intentionality as a confab on consciousness, also got gallantry in other areas especially philosophy of mind. Husserl’s idea of intentionality

¹ Lewis, Staehler, 2018

² Ibid, P.49

adopted from partially from Brentano, got critical attention too from thinkers such as Sartre. The intentional feature of consciousness as always directed to something, doesn't notice the inwardness of consciousness and it is a problem according to Sartre. For him, Husserl's notion of consciousness opened directly onto an outside, and it has no interior space of representation. Sartre brings in the interior of consciousness which is something akin to a cabinet where the consciousness would store the impressions gotten from the intentionally directed outside object/world.³ Carrying such criticisms on consciousness concepts, this article endeavors to discuss the concepts of intentionality and intersubjectivity in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and explore the philosophical solutions for lived-world problems of intersectionality with reference to these phenomenological concepts. Intersectionality is a term evolved in recent academics to address the inequalities and identity issues due to various socio-cultural contexts. The everyday lifeworld experiences caused by the differences in identities and subjectivities within indigenous communities are taken as examples to substantiate the covert connection between intersubjectivity and intersectionality.

Individuality, Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity

Subjectivity and individuality had been identified by some scholars such as Andrea Strazzoni as two streams of early modern philosophy.⁴ He asserts that modern philosophy is seen as a subjectivist turn in philosophical movement. He also admits that it has been related to the long-standing issues of identity and individuality. The individuation of human beings could be noticed in scholastic thought as well. The ideas of subjectivity also could be traced back to the ancient times of Aristotle with reference to metaphysical and ontological pursuits. 'In the early modern period, theories of individuality are based on the Aristotelian

³ Ibid, P. 133,134

⁴ Strazzoni, 2015

term “substance (ousia).” In the works of Aristotle (384–322 BCE), one finds three interrelated notions, with which the question, of what an individual is, can be answered: these are the substance as subject, substance as substrate, and substance as an independent being. First, in the *Categories*, substance is identified with subjects that cannot be predicated of other beings.⁵ The discussion of individuality was done during this ancient time with reference to such issues of substance and its properties. The question of whether the substance could exist without properties was finally decided by Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* that it is possible. But the properties cannot exist without substance. The philosophical thinking on human entity might lead us to trail this properties of a substance as subjectivity or individuality. Up to the late scholasticism of the sixteenth century, different theories of individuality were developed based on the Aristotelian tradition, says Oliver Toth.⁶ Toth also explains that for Thomists human individuals are individuated by their substantial form as it is in their matter. He adds the points of Scotists in the 13th century who argued that they are individuated by their “haecceity” that is formally distinct from the universal. And Franco Burgersdijk in the early 17th century argued that they are individuated by their minds i.e. substantial forms, picking out their bodies.⁷ According to Toth, these theories were entertained that they are individuated by a negation differentiating them from the universal, or that they are individuated by the sum of their accidents.

Descartes’s theory of individuality attempted to solve the question of how substances of the same type are individuated. Spinoza and Leibniz also added responses to this discussion. The discussion of individuality turns into the discussion of subjectivity and the experiences that constitute subjectivity, in the works of empiricist philosophers Locke and Hume. Toth explains this empiricist debates over the individuality and

⁵ Toth, 2021

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

subjectivity. ‘An individual person is an individual subject of consciousness, which defines the metaphysical boundaries of the person, independently of the substances constituting her. The person stretches back in time as far as her conscious memory does: if one can recall a past experience, the subject of that experience was the same person as the one remembering it today, if not, then not. This theory allows for quite extreme cases of personal individuation: if someone comes to remember all the deeds of Socrates but forgets her own deeds, she becomes identical with Socrates; if someone has a different and incommunicable consciousness while being sober and while being drunk, there are two persons in one body’.⁸ Using the term ‘identity’ and embarking into related ideas could be sieved through Locke’s notion of personal identity. But there are still more arguments on whether it is compatible with the widely accepted doctrine of transitivity of identity.⁹

The ontological definition of what is an individual- may it be either human or natural, was done with reference to the notions of body, mind, soul, and related concepts. This approach is characterized not only in Scholastic debate on the individuation of natural and human beings, but also in the analysis of Descartes faced the problems of subjectivity and individuation from the same standpoint of the Scholastics.¹⁰ The subjectivities defined within the frameworks of theology in scholastic period continued in the early modern period too with rationally sought proofs. It is also obvious in Descartes’ *Principles of Philosophy* written in 1644. John Locke maintained the relevance of experience in forming subjectivities in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689). A range of philosophers from Descartes to Hegel in the rationalist tradition, and the empiricists such as Locke and Hume have discussed the individuation and identity formation aspects of human beings . In the

⁸ Ibid, p.6

Also see, Locke, 1979, pp. 2.27.13–20.

⁹ Kaufman, 2015, pp 236–259

¹⁰ Strazzoni, 2015

book titled *The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume* (2011), Udo Thiel has unveiled these discussions in detail.¹¹ The *Cartesian Cogito* or the arguments of anti-Cartesian philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke couldn't address the real-life experiences regarding the subject that develops a subjectivity and its identity formation.

The early modern category of the 'subject' and the ideas on subjectivity, along with the discussions on identity and individuality eventually brings us to an ontological blur where the questions of the source of mental contents or mental states remain unanswered. The metaphysical and epistemological fights between rationalists and empiricists remained for some centuries resulting in the existentialist and phenomenological movement in twentieth-century philosophy. It is at this historical point, that philosophers started thinking about the external agency that would cause the mental states of individuals, which empiricists had explained as experience. The external agencies could be any social organising factors such as religion, culture, caste, race, community, constitution, legal system etc. The agency that would cause or facilitate the subjectivity or a human individual could be other individuals too. The aspect of intersubjectivity is understood that way in interdisciplinary studies, and it was brought into philosophical discussion by Husserl in his phenomenological prospect.

Husserl's idea on intersubjective phenomenology was developed during 1910 to 1920 and that could be understood as a response to the long standing issue of modern subjectivity and individuality. Though it was well-known to be transcendental, there are scholars who analysed the intersubjectivity in the Husserlian phenomenology as psychological, metaphysical, ethical or sociological. Many scholars probe into the intersubjective reduction and took the Husserlian intersubjectivity as

¹¹ Thiel, 2011, pp 36-43.

transcendental idealism. According to Schnell, ‘Actually, this is neither a systematic structure that *grounds consciousness, nor a “collective consciousness” (or a “superego”)*. Moreover, it does not characterize a “social” (*mundane*) relationship that would be noticed *from the outside*. Transcendental intersubjectivity – and this is a completely original and new perspective – is a *relationship between Me and the other* that can be analysed only *within* this relationship, *starting* from the *ego*.’¹² According to him, the transcendental subjectivity spreads all over intersubjectivity or it is rather transcendental subjectivity that is more comprehensive in itself. He thinks It is comprehensive as primordial monad which intentionally contains in itself other monads that it has to treat like other transcendentals. For him, the phenomenological intersubjectivity is transcendental intersubjectivity and it appears to be always starting from an individual ego and not from the collective consciousness.¹³ Then the empathy for the other and the interventions with other subjects, are to be understood as done with the individuation of oneself, in the intersubjective phenomenology. It draws into a definition of intersubjectivity as Husserl himself pointed out in between as ‘sociological transcendental philosophy’.¹⁴ But within this possibility of socially and thus culturally connected understanding of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, Husserl himself leaves intense psychologically related deliberations with the concept of intentionality.

Intentionality and Intersubjectivity: Possible Philosophical Interventions

There are various scholarly claims that Husserl was immensely influenced by the psychological theories in association with Franz Brentano and thus he brought the intentionality theory into phenomenology. Intentionality is an idea on how human mind and its consciousness are defined by the aboutness of an object. The subjective

¹² Schnell, 2010

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

aspect of the intentional aboutness of an object is taken as important in phenomenology. So that, the approach of intersubjective intentionality also becomes crucial in understanding the process in which Husserl developed phenomenology. Intentionality is closely associated with the deliberations evolved on phenomenological intersubjectivity and philosophy of mind. Though it all basically sounded as dealing with minds as own minds and other minds, consciousness of one and the other, there is a great lot of connotations of social aspects connected to the terms and concepts such as lived experience and lifeworld in phenomenological approach. So, there is no stalemate in conceiving phenomenology as a philosophy holding psychological, sociological, and individual aspects of intermingling experiences of human being in the world they share. This kind of philosophy could flourish into the new avenues of counselling, for solving issues of interpersonal and social imbroglio. Understanding intersubjectivity with reference to intentionality could be then embarking into the pathways of philosophical counselling through phenomenology.

Intentionality in its concept could be applied to understand the directedness of consciousness towards the other, which would obviously bring out the intersubjectivity aspect in continuation with the process. But philosophers of phenomenology would not agree fully with the intentionality concept of psychologists. It is because for the psychologists all the mental states as well as levels of consciousness are directed towards something or some phenomena. Husserl's teacher Franz Brentano, himself picked up the term 'intentional' from its use in medieval philosophy and explained it as deriving from the Latin verb 'intendere', which means "to point to" or "to aim at", and Brentano accordingly characterized the intentionality of mental states and experiences as their feature of each being "directed toward something".¹⁵ Intentionality in this technical sense then subsumes the everyday notion

¹⁵ McIntyre and Woodruff Smith, 1989, pp. 147-79.

of doing something “intentionally”: an action is intentional when done with a certain “intention”, i.e., a mental state of “aiming” toward a certain state of affairs.¹⁶ Brentano being the most famous for a very strong doctrine about intentionality, was not followed by Husserl too fully because he claimed that intentionality is the defining characteristic of the mental, and that all mental phenomena are intentional and only mental phenomena are intentional.¹⁷ Almost all philosophers including Husserl, consider the first half of Brentano’s Thesis, but they held the position that the mental states or moods such as depression or euphoria are not always “of” or “about” something. Husserl noted that, sensations such as pain or dizziness are not obviously representational or “directed toward” some object. ‘Husserl’s interest is in those mental states or experiences that do give us a sense of an object, and those mental phenomena are intentional; he calls them “acts” of consciousness. Husserl seems to have thought that only states of conscious awareness are intentional, but we need not be that restrictive: if there are unconscious beliefs and desires, for example, they too should be counted as intentional mental phenomena.’¹⁸ These analyses would definitely facilitate in understanding mental states, consciousness and intentional acts etc. in a different way than that of psychology. This would also explore the possible philosophical interventions in the intersubjective aspects confronted in lived world experiences due to the mental states and consciousness that are not about some particular object or phenomena. Identifying such facets of intersubjectivity during the experiences of social or interpersonal mingling in the lifeworld, would contribute immensely to develop a philosophical intervention in counselling possibility.

Husserl’s ideas of intentionality to expound it in terms of consciousness directed to an object, faced critical additions to see it as human’s

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

experience of the environment by Merleau-Ponty. Experience about the environment means, experience about the behaviours and thus minds of other people. The issue of reading and interpreting the ‘other minds’ had been under severe scrutiny in recent decades of philosophising. Anita Avramides opined the problem of other minds arose with Descartes’ philosophy of mind,¹⁹ but Jan Almang says it is not necessarily with Descartes.²⁰ But for Almang the problem of other minds did not become a major issue in philosophy until the 20th century and when it became a major problem, several different schools of philosophy pursued solutions independently of each other. Husserl put forward a radical program for philosophy in which we should bracket all our presuppositions and past existence and thus understand all phenomena as they appeared in the consciousness. Though it is a study of phenomena, Husserl wanted to make sure that phenomenological inquiries had objective validity and at the same time they were intersubjectively accessible.²¹ Husserl made sure that it was possible to account for intersubjectivity within the realms of a phenomenological inquiry. Husserl’s inquiries were shaped primarily by the framework of transcendental phenomenology though he tried to rectify human as body and mind.²²

Merleau-Ponty being the most significant theorist of intersubjectivity within the phenomenological tradition apart from Husserl, engaged in clarifying the phenomenology of perception and of the body. Nevertheless he was influenced and indebted heavily on Husserl, he criticises and goes beyond them to explore the aspects of perception. The substance of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of intersubjectivity is expressed not only in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, but also in an essay entitled ‘The Child’s relation with Others’.²³ Almang identifies that there are two critical aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of

¹⁹ Avramides, 2001

²⁰ Almang, 2007

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.p.158

intersubjectivity. The first aspect is the emphasis on seeing the movements of the other as movements that I could perform with my body. The second is that perception of another human being entails one seeing the world as outlining possible actions for him or her.²⁴ Human movement and its visual perception is normally automatically apprehended by means of the body schema of the perceiver as embodied knowledge of how to perform the same movement, and that would be the case for children before they acquire language and related concepts. Then we perceive others as engaged with meaningful context, and they are possible meaning in one's own body for the perceiver. This is intersubjectivity involved with intentionality and body schema transfer, according to Merleau-Ponty.

‘What is noteworthy about this concise statement of his position is that the body schema is conceived of as having a crucial function in the perception of the Other as another human being. The Other is not seen as a body with a connected soul, but as another embodied agent with a body schema. The other is seen as such because the visual image of him is “interpreted” against the background of the body schema of the perceiver. Moreover, it is not a body image, or some other kind of cognitive model of the body of the perceiver, that is employed in this process. The intentionality of the body underlies our perception of others’.²⁵ The intentionality is involved because one's own consciousness is directed towards the perceived body and its schema. Such understanding from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology might also give some exquisite insight about intersubjectivity in its theoretical sense. And the various in-depth analyses done by scholars would facilitate further possibilities of incorporating the philosophy with still more areas of interdisciplinary importance to solve many life-world issues for human beings. Thus phenomenology of intersubjectivity could be applied for the purpose of developing philosophical counselling.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

Philosophical counselling in experiential issues in life-worlds would also contribute to address the socio-cultural problems around intersectionality and intersubjectivity.

Intersubjectivity, Intersectionality and Indigenous Life-world

Whether philosophy could cure the social, individual and subjective problems, is a question that pertains to the thoughts of philosophers themselves. But a connected debate over the experiences of intersubjectivity and intersectionality would definitely shed light on the problems due to identity politics, and to find a philosophical solution to attain peace and justice for all humans. The experiences of Intersubjectivity is a theme that gives the best possibilities to understand intersectionality and vice versa. Intersectionality is a term that emerged in recent postmodern and post-structuralist era, in doing interdisciplinary studies in social sciences to analyse the inequalities and hierarchies that are overlapping due to factors such as caste, class, religion, ethnicity, gender etc. Thus it is also a membrane to address the issues of identity, individuality and subjective positions as me and the Other etc. How the multiple identities of an individual, strips out of the intersubjective experiences could be well described by intersectionality. The intersections of the lifeworld in which one person goes through varied experiences of identities as a teacher, student, son, daughter, husband, wife, lover etc. would instigate friction in the intersubjectively shared world. Moreover, the identities of citizenship, religion, caste, class, race, ethnicity etc. may mould more complex lived experiences in terms of intersectionality and intersubjectivity. Intersectionality works as a theory to include all such bearings in analysis that cause inequality and hierarchy in intersubjective relations. And understanding intersubjectivity in-depth would facilitate in dealing with issues of intersectionality at play in our lifeworld experiences.

The diligence that philosophers sought to clarify such terms and concepts would contribute to any society, even convoluted indigenous

communities and cultures. Studies in this regard point out that there are epistemological challenges of intersectionality, if we study the indigenous ways of knowing about interconnectedness. And they validate that issues related to indigenous people and communities are broad and complex because doing research within indigenous studies has to consist of more than simply discussing indigenous identity.²⁶ Various questions on the intersectional approaches of research methodologies are to be discussed, while emphasizing either gender or class to benefit Indigenous studies. Intersectionality is an approach for describing and analysing how different kinds of social identities work together and/or against each other.²⁷ When we try to understand a society or community in the wake of some burning problems it is mandatory to make an in-depth intersectional analysis to find a proper solution. Even if there is no kind of catastrophic situation existing, some sort of identity clashes that would hinder the smoothness in intersubjective mingling with empathy and solidarity, would also mandate such an analysis. By making an analysis on the experiences of a girl born into Sami indigenous community in Sweden, a study by Oslen Torjer asserts the intersectional analysis in the methodology of studying indigenous identity and community.²⁸ Oslen states ‘Every person and community is positioned with regard to different systems of privilege and social categories such as ethnicity, gender, class/privilege, and so on. Scholars cannot know beforehand how privilege plays out and which subject position(s) is (are) emphasized and which is (are) downplayed. Thus, the scholar needs to reach an initial understanding of the situation at hand before embarking on a thorough analysis.’²⁹ To illustrate this argument, Oslen takes the female protagonist from the Swedish director Amanda Kernell’s award-winning film *Sami Blood* (2016). ‘The Sámi girl Elle-Marja, grows up in a reindeer-herding family in the South Sámi area of Sweden during the

²⁶ Oslen, 2018

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

1930s. Facing school and state demands, harassment by Swedish neighbours, and alienation from her family, Elle-Marja tries to break with everything related to being Sami. She even changes her name to the more Swedish-sounding Christina.³⁰ The case study of Sami Blood is an example of an intersectional analysis combining indigeneity and gender and more factors. By unravelling further aspects of the film, Oslen argues that an intersectional approach is needed to understand Elle-Marja's situation and story. The Sami people are having privileged and high positioned identity in their thickly populated territory of Northern Sweden, but in the other parts of Sweden, they could feel marginalised as tribal people. The indigenous identity could confuse their subjective position and consciousness of the status quo in the intersubjective relations with the non-tribal people in other parts of the country that are working with intersectional elements of the hierarchy.

The terms interconnectedness, intermingling etc that we use in everyday conversation could be understood in terms of intersubjectivity in phenomenological philosophy. The subjectivities that are caused by particular mental states that occur intentionally might provide either smooth or harsh intersubjective experiences with other subjects. Since the other minds are only inaccessibly accessible as seen by the Husserlian perspective, it may be productive to see the various socio-cultural elements with which the intersubjective experiences are determined. Intersectionality becomes noteworthy then to examine the possibilities of intentionality in the consciousness of minds or bodies that might mingle at various levels in life-worlds. May it be the mental states of the Husserlian intentional consciousness or the perceived body schema of Merleau-Ponty that makes the consciousness, the intersectional elements that may play in the lived world experiences are crucial. The intersectional focus is on the interplay of identities, as well as on how multiple forms of power can either push or pull social identities.³¹

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ May, 2015. P.3

Studies on pursuing intersectionality, state that historical context illustrates clearly how intersectionality as a concept is rooted in the experiences of formerly-enslaved Black American women such as Sojourner Truth.³² It is obvious that the works of women abolitionists were taken forward after almost a century in the 1970s by the Combahee River Collective, and developed by more well-known intersectional scholars such as Kimberle Crenshaw, a legal theorist who is accepted as key person coining the term. The analysis of the vast body of writings traversing time and geographical location, intersectional tradition could be understood as a radical school of thought founded in the lived experiences and theorising of Black women, women of colour and women throughout the global South.³³

If we look at even more examples worldwide, we could find this fact explicitly exercised among indigenous people. The analysis on the lived experiences of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, is one of the best examples that outlined the considerations for applying intersectionality when engaging with Indigenous Peoples.³⁴ The implications of failure to adopt an intersectional lens when engaging with Torres Strait Islander Peoples, with a particular focus on Native Title, is visualised in the study on land use and natural resource planning, and public engagement as forms of public policy. The inequities that characterise the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians are understood in analysis with intersectionality approach, showed it as intimately connected to the history of colonialism too in Australia. Thus various binary discourses of tribal vs. non-tribal, native vs. non-native etc. are to be revisited with intersectionality at play, which is missed in the basic conceptualization. White women feminists all too often use the rhetoric of intersectionality as a way to deflect from the complicity in racism, white supremacy, and settler-colonialism, without

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Osborne, Howlett, & Grant-Smith, 2019

engaging seriously with the (decolonial) work intersectionality demands, and without taking seriously the material conditions and struggles of Aboriginal Peoples.³⁵

The Black feminist theorizations that emerged extensively in the United States also flourished with reference to intersectionality approach. Feminist studies worldwide have been using intersectionality and intersubjectivity analysis as a method or approach in recent decades to interpret the issues of inclusion and exclusion that women experience. The implications generated from the structures of social organizing factors that subjugate the female, disabled and other genders, raise the issues of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, that could be understood well with intersectionality. Even the subjugation of men in the name of race, ethnicity and class backgrounds could be noticed in the concerned histories and territories. A case study done on a man named Ramiro, born in the province of Tucuman in Northwest Argentina in 1957 caters to experiences of subjectivities of citizenship, race, class and gender being articulated in an intersectional mode.³⁶ Though born as a man Ramiro faces oppression from other men such as policemen for not holding an ID card. The political centralization of Argentine state marginalizes the country's border zones, and being born in that symbolic spatial hierarchy, people lived there experienced the otherness in terms of the invisible citizenship. Ramiro was seen as indigenous, Black, Morocco, Black and even Indian, after having moved to Buenos Aires from the Argentine Northwest, a peripheral territory where he was born. The same man also faces repressed status as a poor informal worker there, along with the ethnicity based racist repression.³⁷ Such cases provide us examples where their subjectivities are transforming due to opted life-worlds than the given, but that too causes complicated intersubjective experiences adding up factors to the intersectionality.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Guizardi., Merenson, 2021

³⁷ Ibid.

Similar studies on indigenous people in different parts of the world could avail an abundant resource from phenomenological intersubjectivity, to understand the multiple oppressions of intersectionality elements experienced in the lived world. Indigenous lifeworld has been under scrutiny by the community people themselves due to various reasons as the ethnic clashes in some places. But still, there are various attempts to revisit the issues of subjectivities and identity politics, and that might procure philosophical emulsions from phenomenological intersubjective understanding. Though the intentionality theory of consciousness might drag us to the psychological pitfalls, the philosophical prospect put forward by phenomenologists would facilitate understanding the intersubjectively shared communities. The critics by later philosophers such as Sartre would also contribute into the evaluation of intentional consciousness of people, which is not only directed towards other things but also towards inwards where the impressions made of the Other is kept by the individual subject. Most of the problems in intersubjective affairs would get eliminated from the intentional consciousness, if it is about ourself than about the Other.

Concluding Remarks

Though the so-called laymen seek momentary source out of the statements/quotes from philosophy for solving lived world issues, it has been identified as a method of counselling only recently by philosophers themselves. How people change their consciousness and objects of consciousness, to attain peace and pleasure is a topic to be pursued still more in the approach of phenomenological intersubjectivity. Husserl's usage of the term transcendental might confuse while applying the approach, but various debates over his ideas would prove that it has strong segments of sociality. It might sound contradictory then that transcendental intersubjectivity appears to be always starting from an individual ego and not from collective consciousness. Though it starts from individuation, or identity formation, probably at the end the sociality, intersubjectivity, empathy for the Other and the interventions

with other subjects, are all attained. So it is to be understood that individuation of oneself, is done initially in the intersubjective phenomenology. This is the point where all social acts are done meaningfully to address issues of inequalities and the complexities due to intersectionality. Even if we take Merleau-Ponty's claims of perceived body schema that might transfer to the consciousness forming the mental states to develop any consolidated subjectivity, intersectional elements are influencing the intersubjective process.

The above analytical account of intersubjectivity and intersectionality has an objective to open up a path for understanding phenomenology, also as an approach for philosophical counselling. This obligation is elucidated through the examples of the most complex identity issues of indigenous people. These examples are also brought into the question of how the multifarious facets of phenomenological corroborations on intersubjectivity and intentionality provide us enough possibilities to engage with identity issues due to intersectional elements of imbrication. Unlike in the larger society and its ideas of identity, though smaller communities are envisaged in indigenous cultures, the identity issues are further complex. Those issues might enormously identify many added factors of intersectionality ingredients while experiencing conflict between indigenous subjectivities and their Other, in the intersubjectively shared life-worlds. The intersubjective relations in-between the indigenous identities also would raise intersectional issues such as region, language, age, profession, religion and clan. Within the smaller communities envisaged in indigenous cultures also intersectional factors such as ablism, classism, sexism etc. might play in the similar way as of larger society. Such various levels of intersectional understanding entail extra introspection and critical interpretation in connection with the transformed life-world experiences of indigenous people after modernity and colonialism, that cause complicated issues of intersubjectivity.

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