

## **Role of Body in Marcel's Metaontological Inquiry**

*Prashant Kumar*

### **Abstract**

*Gabriel Marcel empathically argues that modern people have lost the ontological sense of being in a global and functionalist world. It is precisely because of this that they seldom inquire about being. The growing tendency to turn a person into mere functions has led many philosophies to refuse to endorse the ontological need. Marcel attempts to break this hypothesis and argues for a meta-problematical realm on which an inquiry into being can be commenced. The paper intends to explicate and evaluate the ground where the mystery of being can be addressed. Further, it also places the body's significance in such metaontological inquiry.*

### **In Lieu of an Introduction**

It seems the awareness of one's existence haunts human beings to raise some uncomfortable questions. Is the mere awareness of the body, or "corporeality"<sup>i</sup> enough to start an ontological inquiry? Or does Descartes' demon still haunt and cast doubt on one's existence? Though Descartes' *cogito* has been critically evaluated first by Brentano and then by Husserl and the other phenomenologists, the foundational background on which one can satisfactorily ask about the notion of being or existence, if we use them synonymously, is not explicit.

Aristotle's project of ontology, though he inquires into such questions under the broad domain of metaphysics, to have a science or a discipline "which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature"<sup>ii</sup> took different roots in the history of ontological studies. However, all these investigations seem to answer one or the other ontological question without delineating the ground to raise the question of being – what makes us ask the question of being? Or, in other words, what pushes or forces us not to ask the question of being, as Marcel Gabriel puts it? One can doubt that if we ask such questions, do

we deal with ontological questions? Is asking the appropriate ground for ontological questions an ontological inquiry? To clearly understand the labyrinth of ontological puzzles, the precise distinction between metaphysics, metametaphysics, and ontology is warranted.

David Manley, in *Introduction: A Guided Tour of Metametaphysics*, gives brief details of what Metametaphysics is by analysing metaphysics, problems of metaphysics, and why some philosophers say that issues of metaphysics are trivial. Manley explicates,

“Metametaphysics is concerned with the foundation of metaphysics. It asks: Do the questions of metaphysics really have answers? If so, are there answers substantive or just a matter of how we use words? And what is the best procedure for arriving at them - common sense? Conceptual analysis? Or assessing competing hypotheses with quasi-scientific criteria?”<sup>iii</sup> (Manley: 2009)

Metametaphysics solely examines the objectives and methodologies of metaphysics. However, the point here is the use of “meta” in metaphysics. The explanation of “meta” concerning metaphysics seems to go well with others such as “metaethics” and “meta-semantics,” as Manley mentioned. Manley, however, appears to forget to tell us whether we answer these questions standing within the domain of metaphysics or standing outside, as pointed out by Timothy Williamson. He states, “. . . [M]etaphilosophy sounds as though it might try to look down on philosophy from above or beyond.”<sup>iv</sup> With this, one can deduce that Manley wishes to look at metaphysics either from above or beyond – leaving thereby the field of metaphysics. Otherwise, the appropriate term would be the philosophy of metaphysics.

On the other side, Gabriel, I believe, provides a clear understanding of metaphysics. He explains, “One can define METAPHYSICS as the attempt to develop a theory of the world as such. Its aim is to describe how the world really is, not how the world seems to be or how it appears to us.”<sup>v</sup> Theodore sider further, adds and argues that “Metaphysics, at

(its) bottom, is about the fundamental structure of reality. Not about what's necessarily true. Not about what properties are essential. Not about conceptual analysis. Not about what there is. Structure.”<sup>vi</sup>

One may further deduce from this: objectives and questions of ontology are different from the goals and the problems of metaphysics. If any philosopher deems that ontology dives so deep to unravel the fundamental structure of reality against how things appear to us, he is mistaken with metaphysics' objectives. To provide transparency in the distinction, Markus Gabriel explains the concerns of ontology – “ontology is the systematic investigation into the meaning of ‘existence,’ or rather the investigation of existence itself aided by insight into the meaning of ‘existence.’”<sup>vii</sup>

It is explicit from the above discussion that the questions of ontology are starkly different from metaphysics and Metametaphysics. However, there can be overlap among three different fields of philosophy (metaphysics, Metametaphysics, and ontology), considering their boundaries are quite fragile.

Under the purview of such discussion, the paper intends to look at the foundation of ontology. It is the ground we want to discern and analyse. So, we can know the conditions for asking the very fundamental question of ontology. It is precisely here that one gets the sense that the inquiry is shifting from ontology to metaontology. Thus, metaontology examines and evaluates the foundation of ontology; what are the aims and objectives of ontology, what methodologies we should adopt, and what conditions do we need to fulfil before we can (or cannot) ask the question of being/existence?

Gabriel Marcel undoubtedly deems the question of being or existence to be the central question of being. However, rather than answering the question of being or existence directly, Marcel attempts to raise serious questions about people losing their sense of being; the conditions that have led humans to divert their attention from the very first question of

their concerns. By closely looking at the menial jobs of humans, as Dostoevsky did in *Crime and Punishment*, Marcel embarks on an investigation to comprehend viable grounds on which we lost the sense of urgency of the ontological question. It seems that Marcel first wishes to clear the ground, and thus enter into ontological inquiry before he can untangle ontological mysteries. The following paragraph explicates the intention of Marcel,

“Rather than to begin with abstract definition and dialectic arguments which may be discouraging at the outset, I should like to start with a sort of global and intuitive characterization of the man in whom the sense of the ontological – the sense of being – is lacking, or, to speak more correctly, of the man who has lost the awareness of this sense. Generally speaking, modern man is in this condition; if the ontological demands worry him at all, it is only dully, as an obscure impulse.”<sup>viii</sup> (Marcel: 2018)

The first few statements of the book not only indicate the hidden objectives of the inquiry but also clarify the use of “metaontological” in the title of the paper. It implicitly tells us that the paper will not analyse or evaluate Marcel’s answer to the fundamental question of ontology. Rather, as Marcel emphatically writes, the paper attempts to delineate the ground for raising the ontological question. It also seeks the role of the body on such grounds – can one plausibly argue for such grounds if the body is removed?

### **Marcel’s Metaontology**

The scepticism regarding one’s existence that Descartes pinned in his works seems lost in most of our lives. It is itself a mystery why people simply cannot engage with the question that is so obvious to them – why do we exist if one cannot ask whether we exist? It appears the given human condition can tell much about non-engagement with the question of existence. Can human conditions indicate the ground for posing

ontological questions? Or it is precisely human conditions that prohibit humans from raising the most fundamental question.

Indeed, Marcel intends to analyse human conditions for his metaontological investigation. However, as Parmenides evaluated the puzzle of being in terms of its negative connotation, i.e., non-being, Marcel too, first, demonstrated “of the man who has lost the awareness”<sup>xix</sup> of being. It is not the metaphysical sense of man that seeks to find the ground for ontological inquiry, but his appearances in the world keep people away from raising the question.

Marcel critically analyses the appearances of people and tries to categorise them through the lens of what he calls “misplacement of the idea of function”<sup>x</sup>. “The individual tends to appear both to himself and others as an agglomeration of functions.”<sup>xi</sup> The history of philosophy, especially Marx’s attempt to understand man through material dialectic and Freudian psychoanalysis<sup>xii</sup>, proposed a fixed vital function of humans for which each one of us gives our heart and blood to fit in. Other than this, man, being a social animal, functions typically as a social being, fulfilling the roles given by society.

Marcel argues that these functions are not just assigned to human beings; but they are related to time as well. Thus creating a schedule. The “goodness” and “efficiency” of a man are judged based on his ability to complete functions on time. “What matters is that there is a schedule”, and men are supposed to function differently depending upon their social situations. Men can only function properly if they are physically and mentally healthy. Thus, this demands a scheduled watch from hospitals and trauma centres to keep a check on men to see whether they are able to function or not. It implies the present construction of a world where men are reduced to mere functions. If a man diverts from his function, there are other institutions such as prisons, mental hospitals, and so on for “scrapping off what has ceased to be of use and must be written off as total loss.”<sup>xiii</sup> (Marcel: 2018)

In this functionalist world, men are deemed ‘functional’ objects where their so-called subjectivity lies in carrying out the function. The world presents the circumstances as a problem; as if they are objectively given and technologies will solve them categorically. It also implies that such an understanding of man and the world has also confined the imagination and future of man under the progress of technologies – A man trapped in the capacities of machines. Marcel concludes this situation as “man is *at the mercy of his technics*.”<sup>xiv</sup> Bernard G. Murchland illuminates a significant point here. He writes,

“And at this point he asks another question upon which the validity of his whole approach literally depends. ‘It is the question’, he remarks, ‘I put when I ask myself who I am and, more deeply still, when I probe into my meaning in asking myself that question’, The degeneration of self-identity in the modern world is crucially relevant in this respect and could not be better symbolized than by the myriad identity forms that a technological society has so profusely multiplied. This ‘form-filling’ approach has tended to reduce the question of identity for all practical purposes to a matter of ‘son of, born at, occupation,’ and so on.”<sup>xv</sup> (Murchland: 1959)

In such a situation, men are forced to see not only the world as an object but also their own existence objectively, which one can problematize. Even the problematization of his existence is nothing but the proper function of one’s life, say if a person is a shopkeeper, his problem of existence would be in terms of becoming a good shopkeeper. The contemporary understanding of the world has reduced everything in problems, and men have lost, what philosophers have called, wonder or mystery. Marcel illustrates this point in the following paragraph,

“In such a world the ontological need, the need of being, is exhausted in exact proportion to the breaking up of personality on the one hand, and, on the other, to the triumph of the category of the purely natural and the consequent atrophy of the faculty of wonder.”<sup>xvi</sup> (Marcel: 2018)

The subject-object duality and understanding the object objectively have brought a sense of verification. Each person can now verify with the sense of objectivity propagated by the natural sciences in the exact same manner as defined. They can all tell what a successful man is and what a successful doctor is precisely because each human being has a fixed set of characteristics dependent upon its function.

The problem with the functionalist sense of problematizing the world and verifiability in terms of objectivity is that it removes wonder. “It should be noted that this world is, on the one hand, riddled with problems and, on the other, determined to allow no room for mystery.”<sup>xvii</sup> Louis Pamlume and Beth Brombert interestingly point out that “this dilemma set off in Gabriel Marcel a veritable intellectual rebellion, the origin, he states, of his entire philosophy. Can one strictly identify verity with verifiability?”<sup>xviii</sup> The question starkly puts a big question mark on the natural discernment of the existence of man. Can one understand the labyrinth of existence with verifiability? What do we lose if we ask such a question in this manner? Gabriel replies, mystery, wonder, and significance of human existence.

The degraded self under the subject-object dichotomy tries to grasp being, something that it withholds. It objectifies being and tries to comprehend it as if it is merely there for the time being. A constant effort to place being in space and time and an activity of verification keep an investigator away from its immediate givenness - an awareness of presence on which everything is based. The objectification of such awareness can generate an artificial attempt to grasp something that is beyond any objectification. It all happens because we ignore our presence.

This analysis does not only illustrate why we are unable to ask ontological questions but also points out our primordial mind-set when looking at the question. The so-called “scientific” attitude strives to break “I” in possible appearances but finds itself unable to resolve the inherent

complexities that come with such dualities. Marcel writes, “It is impossible that everything should be reduced to a play of successive appearances which are inconsistent with each other.”<sup>xxix</sup>

Marcel argues that such an attitude towards ontological inquiry degrades life and kills the spirit of its roots. However, it does not nullify the possibility of grasping being, and even the ways of life give us the impression that we are continuing with the inquiry of existence, however illusory it can be.

Let us turn to the positive way of commencing an ontological inquiry. Despite the functionalist tendencies of a man, one feels the need and can raise a host of questions. We seek to devise the specific conditions that can help us enter into an inquiry into being. Marcel lists a set of questions to discern ontological needs. “Is there such a thing as being? What is it? etc. Yet immediately, an abyss opens under my feet: I who ask these questions about being, how can I be sure that exist.”<sup>xxx</sup>

We witness a turn from the investigating being to the ontological status of the investigator. It too evaluates the situatedness of an investigator; whether he is outside of the inquiry, before, beyond, or after it. Marcel emphatically argues that the moment one tries to introduce such a manner of asking these questions, one falls trapped in what he calls fictional idealism. “I” the investigator, simply cannot be beyond or before, precisely because it ends up in an infinite regress. “By the very fact of recognizing it in a certain way: I see that this process takes place within an affirmation of being - an affirmation which I am rather than an affirmation which I utter, by uttering it I break it, I divide it, I am on the point of betraying it.”<sup>xxxi</sup>

This implies a significant question. How does one see the investigator, or “I” in such ontological need? We have already excused two possibilities, a) “I” must not be placed in subject-object duality, and b) it must not be placed outside of the inquiry as if she is merely an observer and falling into an endless regression. Marcel hints at the point that “To



raise the ontological problem is to raise the question of being as a whole and of one-self seen as a totality.”<sup>xxii</sup>

What does Marcel mean by “I” seen as a totality? If one cannot break “I” into successive appearances and fictional ideas, in what way does “I” need to be understood? It is evident that “I” is not investigated as an epistemic self but as an ontological self. Thus, the division and breakdown into component parts seem redundant, as Marcel points out. So, how should one consider the ontological “I”?

To answer this question satisfactorily, Marcel argues,

“It might be said, by the way of an approximation, that my inquiry into being presupposes an affirmation in regard to which I am, in a sense, passive, *and of which I am the stage rather than the subject*. But this is only at the extreme limit of thought, a limit which I cannot reach without falling into contradiction. I am therefore led to assume or to recognize a form of participation that has the reality of a subject ; this participation cannot be, by definition, an *object* of thought; it cannot serve as a solution – it appears beyond the realm of problems: it is meta-problematical.”<sup>xxiii</sup>

(Marcel: 2018)

Marcel pushes the ground of inquiry from problematical to meta-problematical. “I” participates in ontological inquiry while being there as the stage as well. Thus, it gives a permanent sense of presence throughout the experiences and inquiries. The ground for inquiry or the stage is not for cognitive consideration precisely because any cognitive consideration breaks the appearances into subject and object duality. Marcel particularly challenges this hypothesis. He further argues,

“If meta-problematical can be asserted at all, it must be conceived as transcending the opposition between the subject who asserts the existence of being, on the other hand, and being *asserted by that subject*, on the other, and as underlying it in a given sense. To postulate the meta-problematical is to postulate the primacy of being over knowledge.”<sup>xxiv</sup>

(Marcel: 2018)

Marcel suggests that subject-object duality must be transcended. It is, thus, the totality of “I” which is neither subject nor object but remains a stage that witnesses everything. In this precise sense, Marcel establishes the primacy of being over knowledge. However, the totality of being still needs to be explicated. Before we grasp a better sense of being, let us problematize the ground for ontological inquiry in terms of the body.

### **Problematizing the Ground**

Marcel clearly explains the ground for asking the question of being in terms of meta-problematical space. In such a space, the being remains passive, providing a strong foundation for commencing any inquiry for cognitive understanding. The investigator is neither the subject that asserts nor the object that can be asserted. Therefore, Marcel argues for a ground that is beyond the subject-object duality.

Murchland tries to grasp such a situation, so the central issue can become clearer. He writes, “How could one become a convert from a spectator of this massive absurdity to a participant? It was in virtue of transmuting the spectator-participant dilemma to a higher level of significance that the central philosophical issue becomes clearer.”<sup>xxv</sup> Marcel ponders over the union of soul and body and is amazed by the mystery of it that he strives to seek the same sense of mystery in, what Murchland calls, a higher level of significance.

In meta-problematical space, as it appears, placing the body becomes a theoretical problem. Though this way of posing the problem itself seems contradictory, Marcel himself works to bring the meta-ontological inquiry out of problematical space. It entails an impasse – how to, first, pose the question in a non-contradictory way, and second, how to discern body in such a stage where “I” is neither a subject nor an object. Does “I” in totality consist of the body or not?

It seems the contradiction lies in our understanding of the body. The givenness of the body or the appearance of the body is as fuzzy as the concept of “I”. Can the notion of “I” be exhausted without the body? If

not, how does “I” appear without being incarnated? If yes, what kind of peculiar relationship does “I” shares with the body? It seems that one cannot have a body like the other objects of the world, as it again puts the whole set up in subject-object duality, which Marcel warns us to avoid. Thus, another challenge for us would be to explicate the relationship between the current sense of “I” and the body.

The distinction between problem and mystery and Marcel’s attempt to have the ground in mystery illustrate a unique sense of “I” with a peculiar union with the body. Despite other challenges mentioned in this section, we too feel the need to explicate the role of the body in a metaontological inquiry.

### **The Role of the Body**

Recall Marcel’s suggestion to start an inquiry – “To raise the ontological problem is to raise the question of being as a whole and of oneself seen as a totality.”<sup>xxvi</sup> The sense of totality indicates the incarnation of being which will be incomplete without an exhausted understanding of the body and its relation to “I”. “The study of the linked problems of sensations and the union of body and soul reveals the irreducibility of existence to objectivity. . . . It encompasses, on the same level as a sensory experience, a ‘mystery’ in which faith emerges as the transcendent analogue.”<sup>xxvii</sup>

Pamplume delineates the ways the body is deemed and the consequences of considering the body as an object. He writes, “we have a natural tendency to view our bodies as instruments that are always at our disposal, but reflection reveals the absurdity of this belief. This instrument is revealed to be nothing more than a tool for increasing or realising a basic human power, with the human body appearing to be the medium through which the instrument's operation is made possible. In order to avoid unintentionally materialising the soul that would employ it, we cannot, therefore, think about it in an instrumentalist fashion. Generally speaking, I can't try to figure out what binds me to my body

without putting myself outside of it in the process; at that point, my body stops being mine and becomes an object of the world. While also lowering myself to a bodyless, soulless.”<sup>xxviii</sup> (Pamplume: 1953)

Body appears as an instrument to carry out functions that are assigned to human beings. Traditionally, body has been placed for anatomy, service, suffering, and many more purposes as if it had no unique relationship with the being. The present understanding, as Marcel argues, is based on a functionalist (mis)understanding of human being, where the body is nothing but a means to certain ends. If the objective is to achieve material ends, the body cannot find any other place but in materialism.

Pamplume argues that the body is not the instrument, but it is the stage where every instrument is possible. Such distinction keeps the body away from strict objectification and brings it closer to being, “I”. The imagination of the body as a stage to perform certain functions is impossible without its relationship to the soul. Similarly, a sense of “I” is impossible without it being incarnated in the body. Any attempt to separate them seems artificial, thus committing a blunder in the metaontological domain. Without a unique relationship, I simply do not exist. Thus, it becomes significant to look at the relationship.

Marcel explicitly does not provide a satisfactory answer. He gives a clue in *The Philosophy of Existence*, which is quoted below. A serious discussion on the body can be found in *Being and Having*, and we will look at it after considering the clue stated in *The Philosophy of Existence*. He writes,

“It is evident that there exists a mystery of the union of the body and soul. The indivisible unity always inadequately expressed by such phrases as *I have a body, I make use of my body, I feel my body, etc.*, can be neither analyzed nor reconstituted out of precedent elements. It is not only data . . . it is the basis of data, in the sense of being my own presence to myself, a presence of which the act of self-consciousness is only an adequate symbol.”<sup>xxix</sup> (Marcel: 2018)

Marcel's earlier attempts to argue for missing mystery and wonder from our lives and its being a significant cause of misunderstanding appear again to discern the body. He describes how the relationship between soul and body has been objectified because thinkers simply cannot place mystery in the union of body and soul. The objectification of such union expressed in similar languages places the body as if one owns it. Such a lack of mystery in the union created an asymmetrical relationship between these two, where "I" or soul is the master of the body. In this brutal sense of objectification, the body swerves away from the soul.

Marcel brings back mystery to the union of soul and body and nullifies the asymmetrical relationship between these two. It is the presence of the body that brings a sense of self-consciousness, for which "I" can be an adequate symbol. It is precisely in this presence, "I" passively acts as a stage for every possible inquiry to occur. Pamplume captures this understanding well in his article.

He illustrates that it understands me, so I am unable to understand it. According to Marcelian language, what is at stake is a mystery rather than a problem. My state of incarnation is defined by the present purpose, the "participation" for which I am my body. The concept of the Incarnation, which is "the central guiding point of metaphysical reflection," disproves both idealism and materialism. According to materialism, I am identified with my body's exterior insofar as it is an item. However, despite how paradoxical the term may sound, the body that I am is not an empiric fact but rather a "body-subject." Contrary to what idealism asserts, the transcendental subject (which is abstract in the true sense of the word) only possesses a secondary actuality in comparison to the incarnate subject. born of a wholly fictional<sup>xxxx</sup>

At this juncture, we need to clarify the terms we have used so far and check their validity in the context of metaontology. Terms such as "relation" and "givenness" are used to explicate the union between body and self. However, these two terms refer to the vocabulary of subject-

object duality. “Relation” assumes two *relata*, whatever they would be, and its use in terms of body and self, pushes us to think of the body in contrast with the soul. Therefore, we consider the body as an object “given” to the self. Similarly, “givenness” suffers from the same problem. Marcel argues that “for every ‘given’ attracts to itself a process of indefinite objectification.”<sup>xxxix</sup> Earlier, we established that the moment we consider the body as an object of the natural sciences, I start vanishing in metaontological inquiry. For such reasons, we need to avoid “relation” and “given”. For brevity and clarity, Marcel suggests using “bond”. “Of this body, I can neither say that it is I, nor that is not I, nor that is for me (object).”<sup>xxxix</sup> Therefore, by changing the terminology and understanding, we start transcending the subject-object duality.

It entails that though the body seems to interact with the world in space and time thus, creating a history of its own. The body is the outcome of such history. However, “I” simply cannot be grasped or introduced to the historical creation of the body. If this is so, I cannot say that I have a body, rather the “mysterious bond between body and I is the foundation of all my powers of having.”<sup>xxxix</sup>

This understanding of the body is categorically depicted by Pamplume’s terminology, namely, body-subject. Body-subject again must not be discerned from subject-object duality, rather, it is the bond of body and “I”. Both appear together, and their awareness comes together; without the body, the sense of I is missing, and without I, the body lacks belongingness. Both together generate a continuous sense of I that permeates all the inquiry one can ever take. Thus, both create a fundamental ground for even ontological inquiry.

Now, we have come to a position where we can establish a few things. As Marcel pointed out that we cannot separate the following things -

1. existence
2. consciousness of self as existing
3. consciousness of self as bound to a body, as incarnate.

This implies that if one needs to ask the ontological question, “I” is existent, existent in terms of self, and bound to a body. The investigator “I” needs to be taken together with all three conditions. Marcel precisely calls this “I” the totality of self.

There are other consequences as well. Marcel talks about it, and by placing the body in such a conversation, the result is a bit different. With the introduction of the body with the same status as “I”, “the problem of existence of the external world is now changed, and perhaps even loses its meaning.”<sup>xxxiv</sup> This also implies that every existing thing is described and placed in the body. This is one of the reasons that we must give the body a privileged metaphysical status in comparison with other things.

The second consequence would be that the bond between “I” and the body at its core is different from the relationship between “I” and other existing things. It is precisely because the relationship between “I” and other objects can still be viewed from the perspective of subject-object duality. This assists us in seeing the unique mystery shared by my body and “I” and “I” simply cannot be separated from the body. Though the body is an absolute mediator, as Marcel argues, the distinction mentioned above, keeps the body unique from other existent objects. Pamplume argues that “My body, in some way ‘in sympathy with things,’ plays the role of an absolute mediator in relation to the world: it is only the nexus of my presence with world rendered manifest.”<sup>xxxv</sup> It entails that if the body shares a unique bond with “I”, ‘my body’ is the main cause of the presence of “I” in the world. Further, he argues, “As I cannot isolate myself in thought from my body, so can I not isolate myself from the universe, that ‘in affecting me, creates me;’ except in fiction.”<sup>xxxvi</sup> The sense of “I” cannot be witnessed without the body. Thus, the body plays a central role in the creation, awareness, and consciousness of “I”.

The body becomes significant in order to start an ontological inquiry. We have already argued for how misunderstanding of the body has led many to believe in a functionalist understanding of the world, where the tasks

of the body are to just carry out vital and social functions. The misunderstanding of the body keeps many of us away from ontological inquiry. However, Marcel's interpretation of the body and its union with self-removed the functional tag from it and placed it at the center to realise "I". The consciousness of "I" is only possible if it is incarnated. In other words, "I" only appears if it comes with a body.

We have argued that in any ontological inquiry, "I" is neither subject nor object. Rather, its presence as a passive stage generates a sense of being, which can be further experienced. If the presence of "I" needs to be understood in totality on such grounds, the body must be taken into consideration, as "I" simply cannot be present without the body. Therefore, the body, in Marcel's philosophy, helps "I" get incarnated and keeps the central stage in metaontological ground.

*Lakshmibai College  
University of Delhi*

## Notes and References

- i. Marcel, Gabriel. (1949), *Being and Having*, trans. By Katharine Farrer, (Republished), Delhi: Isha Books, p. 82
- ii. Aristotle. (2001) 'Metaphysics', in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*: Revised Oxford Edition, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes, tr. W. D. Ross, Princeton: Princeton University Press.1003a20-25
- iii. Ibid, p. 1
- iv. Williamson, Timothy. (2007), *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, New Jersey: Blackwell Pub., p. ix
- v. Gabriel, Markus. (2015) *Why the World does not Exist*, Trans. By Gregory S. Moss, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 6
- vi. Theodore, Sider. (2012), *Writing the Book of the World*, London: OUP, p. 1
- vii. Ibid, p. 5
- viii. Marcel, Gabriel. (2018), *The Philosophy of Existence*, Island: Cluny Media, p. 6
- ix. Ibid., p. 6
- x. Ibid., p. 6
- xi. Ibid., p. 6
- xii. Cf., Ibid., p. 6
- xiii. Ibid., p. 8
- xiv. Ibid., p. 29
- xv. Murchland, Bernard., (1959), "The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel", in *The Review of politics*, Vo. 21, No. 2, p. 347
- xvi. Ibid., p. 19
- xvii. Ibid., p. 9



- xviii. Louis Pamplume & Beth Brombert., (1953), “Gabriel Marcel: Existence, Being, and Faith”, in *Yale French Studies*, no. 2, p. 90.
- xix. Marcel, Gabriel, *The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 10
- xx. Ibid., p. 12
- xxi. Ibid., p. 15
- xxii. Ibid., p. 14
- xxiii. Ibid., p. 15
- xxiv. Ibid., p. 15
- xxv. Murchland., “The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel”, p. 343
- xxvi. Ibid., p. 14
- xxvii. Pamplume, Louis. “Gabriel Marcel: Existence, Being, and Faith”, p. 90
- xxviii. Cf. Ibid., p. 90
- xxix. Marcel. *The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 16
- xxx. Cf. Pamplume, Louis. “Gabriel Marcel: Existence, Being, and Faith”, p. 90
- xxxi. Marcel, Gabriel. *Being and Having*, p. 13
- xxxii. Ibid., p. 12
- xxxiii. Ibid., p. 84
- xxxiv. Ibid., p. 10
- xxxv. Pamplume, Louis. “Gabriel Marcel: Existence, Being, and Faith”, p. 91
- xxxvi. Ibid., p.91