

Thinking about Thinking: *After Heidegger*

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Abstract

The discipline of philosophy is often defined as the art of thinking about thinking, that is, the human activity of thinking becoming self-conscious and critiquing its own presuppositions. What I aim to do in these proposed lectures, within the broad contours of the phenomenological tradition, is to critically look at the Heideggerian pendulum encapsulated in his work entitled *What is Called Thinking?* (translation of *Was Heisst Denken?* written in 1951-52, first published in 1968) and to lay bare its hermeneutic contours. Heidegger delineates the fourfold character of the primordial question ‘What is called thinking?’ in this way: firstly, that which is designated by ‘thinking’; secondly, the prevailing theory of thought that is taken to stand for thinking; thirdly, the prerequisites one needs to perform the act of thinking; and fourthly, that which commands one to think. For Heidegger the fourth question is of paramount importance for it reveals the symbolic structure that holds together the other three questions. This calling to thinking is of fundamental nature for Heidegger and this call is to be distinguished from mere sound and noise. Further thinking is not having an opinion or notion, neither it is representing or entertaining an idea. Nor is it ratiocination or presenting a cluster of premises from which one can infer a valid conclusion. Neither this thinking is conceptual and systematic in the sense of *Begriff* (concept) which for Hegel is thinking *par excellence*. For Heidegger thinking is a response on the human being’s part to a revelatory call that emanates from the nature of things which Heidegger calls *Being* itself. This act of thinking is reciprocal in that thinking is determined by that which is to be thought as well as by the thinker who thinks. The Heideggerian challenge comes to the fore when he says that ‘what is most thought-

provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking.’

Key Words

Heidegger, Thinking about Thinking, Call to Thinking, Meditative Thinking, Thinking and Being, Alêtheia

Three dangers threaten thinking. The good and thus wholesome danger is the nighness of the singing poet. The evil and thus keenest danger is thinking itself. It must think against itself, which it can only seldom do. The bad and thus muddled danger is philosophizing.

Heidegger¹

Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking ...

Heidegger²

We never come to thoughts. They come to us.

Heidegger³

The Heideggerian Problematic of Thinking About Thinking

In wrestling with the philosophical writings or rather to employ the rightly worded expression ‘the Pathmarks’⁴ of Heidegger, a very foundational notion that comes up in the horizon of understanding is undoubtedly that of thinking. Within the contours of the Heideggerian *weltanschauung* it can be called fulcrum of a ‘basic-concept’ or a ‘ground-concept.’ In the words of Heidegger:

¹ Martin Heidegger (2001) (1975), *Poetry, Language, Thought* trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York, Harper Perennial Modern Classics, p. 8.

² Heidegger (1968) (1954), *What is Called Thinking? A Translation of Was Heisst Denken?* trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray. New York, Evanston and London, Harper & Row Publishers. p.6.

³ *Ibid.*, p.

⁴ It is evident that Heidegger did not want to refer to his writings in terms of ‘works’ for he always considered his thought to be fundamentally ‘on the way’ and he wanted his books, essays and lectures to be considered as ‘pathmarks’ rather than completed works or finished projects - See Bret W. Davis, “Introduction: Key Concepts in Heidegger’s Thinking of Being” in Bret W. Davis (ed.) (2010), *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts*. Durham, Acumen Publishing Limited, p. 4.

Basic concepts” or “Ground Concepts” means for us here: grasping the ground of beings as a whole. ... When we have grasped something we also say something has opened up to us. ... Thus “to grasp” the ground means above all that the “essence” of the ground embraces us into itself, and that it speaks to us in our knowing about it.⁵

This would mean that in the Heideggerian oeuvre, the activity of thinking philosophically about thinking, or what one might call the problematic of self-understanding of philosophy belongs to the very womb or the ‘birth-ing’ of the ‘ground concepts’ or the ‘basic concepts’. This to my mind is the very reason why Heidegger, despite his virulent critics like Paul Edwards, is seen according to Richard Rorty and others like Hans-George Gadamer, Karl Rahner, and Hannah Ardent as ‘one of the most original philosophers of twentieth century’ as well as ‘a genius who thinks of something new’.⁶ A conceptual correlatedness can be found in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guttari’s much celebrated work *What is Philosophy*. Engaging the very nature and significance of the discipline called philosophy it suggests that “philosophy is the art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts.”⁷ Interestingly Deleuze and Guttari contend that this answer to the question what philosophy is would lead to a further challenging interrogation: what are concepts? Further this may lead to another interrogation: does concept engendering happen only in the province of the discipline of philosophy?

In an early lecture course Heidegger delivered in the year 1920, he indicates the very nature and significance of the self-understanding of philosophy. He says:

The problem of the self-understanding of philosophy has always been taken too lightly. If one grasps this problem more radically, one finds that philosophy arises from factual life experience. And within factual

⁵ Heidegger (1993), *Basic Concepts*. Trans. G.E. Aylesworth. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 18-19.

⁶ See Paul Edwards (1989), “Heidegger’s Quest for Being” *Philosophy*, Vol. 64, pp. 437ff.

⁷ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guttari (1994), *What is Philosophy?* Columbia University Press, New York, p. 2

life experience philosophy returns back into factual life experience.⁸

It is this philosophical engagement with the problematic of the self-understanding of philosophy that invites one to the primordial home of ‘thinking about thinking’ and dares to question its presuppositions. Heidegger himself contrasted the ‘works’ done in sciences with that of ‘thinking’ undertaken in philosophy. For Heidegger the sciences have the sole aim of ‘progress’ whereas philosophy has the aim of ‘regress’. It is taking a step back from the usual habit of thinking object-centrally resulting in the primal act of thinking about thinking, which is, thinking itself becoming self-critical and reflective. It is in this context that Heidegger makes this shocking statement: ‘Sciences do not think’.⁹ What Heidegger means by this is that science mostly does not radically question its assumed presuppositions. It is happy doing the research within the given framework of its unexamined presuppositions and parameters. Heidegger would undertake a critical investigation of these given presuppositions which enjoy a kind of apodictic certainty in the weltanschauung of science. Employing Thomas Kuhn’s categories, one can say that Heidegger would take a keen philosophical interest in ‘revolutionary science’ that gives rise to ‘paradigm shifts’ and not so much in the practice of ‘normal science’ which takes for granted the given paradigmatic cluster of presuppositions.¹⁰ Further for Heidegger thinking is not a matter of ‘work and achievement’ within a given set of paradigmatic presuppositions that gives rise to intelligibility and understanding but rather more importantly it is a kind of ‘thanking and attentiveness’ which radically shakes up the assumed certainty of horizons and in that giving birth to a philosophical thinking that is meditative and holistic in nature. In encountering this primeval philosophical activity of thinking about thinking, one can possibly (in a sense arbitrarily) pick out the following three writings of Heidegger:

⁸ Heidegger (2004), *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, trans. M. Frisch & J.A. Gosetti-Ferencei. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 6-7.

⁹ Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?* p.8.

¹⁰ See Heidegger (1978), *Basic Writings*. Ed. David Farrell Krell. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 271ff.

1. Discourse on Thinking.¹¹
2. What is Called Thinking?¹²
3. Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)¹³
4. The Event¹⁴
5. The Thinker as Poet¹⁵
6. Letter on Humanism¹⁶

Here my effort will be to revisit the Heideggerian project as it unfolds in *What is Called Thinking?* with occasional references to his other writings mentioned above.

The Structure and Argument of What is Called Thinking?

What is Called Thinking? (hereafter WCT) comprises a course of university lectures delivered by Heidegger in 1951 and 1952 at the University of Freiburg. In an important sense these lectures were both his last and first: ‘last’ in the sense that Heidegger formally retired from the University after delivering these lectures; ‘first’ in the sense that after the French occupying forces had forbidden Heidegger to teach and later when he was permitted to teach, these lectures he delivered were his first public intellectual engagement with the students. The original German edition of these lectures appeared in the year 1954 and the English translation appeared in the year 1968. And the translators Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray make the claim that WCT may possibly be

¹¹ Written by Heidegger during the period from 1944-55 and the German version *Gelassenheit* appeared in 1959 and the English version by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund appeared in 1966.

¹² Heidegger wrote it during the period from 1951-51 and it was originally published in German under the title *Was Heisst Denken?* in the year 1954. The English version by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray appeared in 1968.

¹³ This work by Heidegger was first published in German in the year 1989 and the English version by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu appeared in 2012, published by Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis.

¹⁴ This collection of Heidegger’s writings was first published in German in the year 2009 and the English version by Richard Rojcewicz appeared in the year 2013, published by Indianan University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis.

¹⁵ Martin Heidegger (2001) (1975), ‘Thinker as Poet’ in *Poetry, Language and Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, New York, Harper Perennial Classics, pp. 1-14.

¹⁶ ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Martin Heidegger (1978) *Basic Writings*. Ed. David Farrell Krell. London & Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.193-242.

“the first Heidegger translation in English to be worked out in close cooperation with the author.”¹⁷ The book consists of two parts: ‘Part One’ is a cluster of ten lectures and ‘Part Two’ comprises eleven lectures. And in a significant sense, WCT can justifiably be described as a signpost on Heidegger’s way. The early Heidegger was deeply engaged with the thought world of Nietzsche and the Nietzschean paradigmatic contention that Western metaphysics culminates in the absolutizing of the will. In these lectures one can sense the gravity of the Heideggerian philosophical imagination while encountering the difficulty of first finding and then losing Nietzsche. In ‘Part Two’ WCT, one finds Heidegger eclipses Nietzsche’s thinking only after he has absorbed it and moves on to the origins of the pre-Aristotelean Greek philosophical thinking.

In Part One of WCT, Heidegger makes this radically thought-provoking claim:

*“Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking.”*¹⁸

Here Heidegger, lest he be seen as a pessimist, explains at a greater length the philosophical import of this statement. Heidegger claims that this has been the case since the early Greek philosophy. In his own words:

“...that we are still not thinking is by no means only because man does not yet turn sufficiently toward that which, by origin and innately, wants to be thought about since in its essence its remains what must be thought about. Rather, that we are still not thinking stems from the fact that the thing itself that must be thought about turns away from man, has turned away long ago.”¹⁹

¹⁷ J. Glenn Gray ‘Introduction’ in *What is Called Thinking*, p. xxvii

¹⁸ Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?* p.6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6-7.

Heidegger continues to spell out the significance of the claim he has advanced and shows that this historical predicament has its roots in the philosophical imagination of the *mythos* and the *logos* as necessarily conceptual opposites/binaries. In his own words:

Myth means the telling word. *Mythos* is what has its essence in its telling- what is apparent in the unconcealedness of its appeal. The *mythos* is that appeal of foremost and radical concern to all human beings which makes man think of what appears, what is in being. *Logos* says the same; *mythos* and *logos* are not ... placed into opposition by philosophy as such; on the contrary, the early Greek thinkers (Parmenides ...) are precisely the ones to use *mythos* and *logos* in the same sense. *Mythos* and *logos* become separated and opposed only at the point where neither *mythos* and *logos* can keep to its original nature.²⁰

Heidegger continuing in this vein says that with Platonism the separation of *mythos* and *logos* became irrevocably pronounced and this combined with the illusion of absolutization of rationality gave rise to the erroneous sense that the *mythos* was destroyed by the advent of *logos*.

Socrates as the Purest Thinker of the West

In Lecture I, Heidegger speaking of Socrates says that Socrates is the purest thinker of the West and all the great thinkers of the West, he contends, are fugitives after Socrates.²¹ This claim made by Heidegger has to be understood in the architectural contours of thinking per se. In his own words:

[T]he reason [for the fact that we are still not thinking] is not that we ... do not sufficiently reach out and turn toward what properly gives food for thought; the reason is that this most thought provoking thing turns

²⁰ Ibid., p. 10.

²¹ Ibid., p. 17.

away from us ...[A]nd what withdraws in such a manner, keeps and develop its own, incomparable nearness. Once we are so related and drawn to what withdraws, we are drawing into what withdraws, into the enigmatic and therefore mutable nearness of its appeal. Whenever man is properly drawing that way, he is thinking – even though he may still be far away from what withdraws, even though the withdrawal may remain as veiled as ever. All through his life and right into his death, Socrates did nothing else than place himself into this draft, this current and maintain himself in it. This is why he is the purest thinker of the West.”²²

What is Heidegger doing here? one might wonder. In imagining humans’ way toward thinking, Heidegger to my mind, is delineating what I call the eschatological – coming from the Greek word *eskaton* meaning ‘already’ and ‘not yet’- nature of thinking per se and he contends that Socrates incarnates perfectly that paradigm.

Elsewhere Heidegger elaborates further on its significance. In *An Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger discusses the nature and characteristics of ‘asking as a primordial power’ and indicates the difference between the questioning spirit and the attitude of religious belief. Religious belief is characterised by the security generated by faith and co-relatively permeated by its own specificity of standing glued to truth. For Heidegger the distinctive character of philosophical thinking as exemplified by Socrates is the passion for genuine questioning. Heidegger finds this character embodied in the Greeks. For the Greeks, according to Heidegger, saw in their ability to question the whole aristocracy of their existence as the differentiating mark from those who were not capable to raise such questions or did not care to do so.²³ Heidegger would subordinate this passion for genuine questioning to the sensitivity of ‘hearing’. For pure

²² Ibid., p. 17. Emphasis added.

²³ Heidegger (1959), *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. trans. Ralph Manheim. Yale University Press, New Haven, p. 42.

questioning is made possible by its quest for the root, the radix, of everything. But this quest, that is *philosophia*, for Heidegger is rooted in the metaphysical conception of Being as Ground. And the very nature of thinking gets modified once such a vision is abandoned. That means that the devoutness of thinking for Heidegger lies in the primordial questioning. And as Heidegger later contends:

Every question is always raised within the horizon of the promise held out by that which is put into question. ... The primary and proper gesture of thought is not questioning; it is rather the hearing of the promise of that which is to come to question.²⁴

The Eschatological Transcending of Duality: Ontic-Ontological

A close analysis of WCT would show that Heidegger (in Part II, Lecture I) is not hesitant to remark that despite the apparent unequivocal and definite nature of the question *What is Called Thinking?* there exists a certain ambiguity with regard to the question as the attempt to respond to the interrogative takes on multiple meanings.²⁵ The ambiguity of the question says Heidegger conceals several possible ways of responding to the question. Enumerating the possible ways of understanding the question, Heidegger focuses on four ways. In the first place, Heidegger says that one should distinguish between what one might call ‘thought’ and ‘thinking’. Further he raises the question of signification of these words. Secondly Heidegger inquires into the traditional way of understanding ‘thinking’ and he raises the all important question why the philosophical tradition has called it by the name ‘logic’. Thirdly Heidegger points out the significance of the necessary pre-requisites that are postulated to think in the right way, that is, to think aright or to engage in what Heidegger calls ‘good thinking’. Fourthly Heidegger brings to our notice a very important

²⁴ Heidegger (1971), *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz. Harper & Row, New York, p. 71.

²⁵ *What is Called Thinking*, pp. 115ff.

dimension: what is that beckons us to thinking at all?²⁶ To my mind these four ways of understanding the primordial question, *what is called thinking*, can be interpreted after the Heideggerian fashion, transcending eschatologically and not chronologically the triangularity of thinking, thought and the thinker. Heidegger is careful to say that all these four questions are inter-related and that all the possible multiple meanings oscillate on the fourth most important question, that is, the interrogative transforms into the vocative, what does call for thinking? Properly considered, this question, Heidegger contends, asks what it is that commands us to enter into thought that calls on us to think.²⁷

The significance of these questions keeps lingering on in our minds when we take a look at the Part 1 where Heidegger considers various meanings of the term ‘thinking’. We give the name ‘thinking’ to calculating, reckoning, problem solving, figuring and planning. In common-sensical language ‘thinking’ is generally taken to mean having ideas or pictures before the mind. In everyday linguistic intercourse one often comes face to face with the assertion that thinking too much means one may never do anything. In the Heideggerian paradigm, the emphasis is not so much on problem solving and calculative thinking but more significantly on the very problematic posed by the interrogative ‘what calls for thinking?’ Heidegger is emphatic to assert that our logical and technological training do not prepare us adequately to respond to this all important interrogation: what is that commands us to thinking?

In Part I, as I have already indicated, Heidegger therapeutically instructs his readers to let go off the usual habits of thinking that would compel one to respond to the interrogation *Was Heisst Denken?* in a given usual sense. He skilfully does so by asking us to dwell/meditate

²⁶ Ibid., p. 114.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 115.

deeply on the issues of learning and teaching. Heidegger picturesquely contrasts the simplicity of craftsmanship in thinking to the complexity on encounters in appropriating the ratiocination that gives birth to technical knowledge. At this juncture Heidegger introduces many lines from the poetic works of the celebrated poet Holderin and ventures to creatively depict the relationship between poetic imagination, that is *poesy*, and thinking. The significant conclusion Heidegger draws is that calculative thinking though very central to sciences fails to fulfil the imperative, the call of the thinking impulse, that is, the vocation of man to dwell in the life of thought. Poesis/poetic imagination takes us, says Heidegger, to a different kind of thinking not so exact in nature unlike scientific thinking but having its own rigour and tenor. Here one encounters a kind of elusive kind of thinking where the object of thinking is experienced as withdrawing into the horizon. But this withdrawal of the object of thought can be of significance only when the thinker is attentive to its movement and direction. This is what constitutes as memory, which in Heideggerian oeuvre is called ‘the gathering of thought’.²⁸ Such an exposition by Heidegger prepares the ground for the reader to listen attentively to the vocative, the radical call: what is that calls man to thinking? As Heidegger, after having taken recourse to the fulcrum of thinking in Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle, significantly remarks:

Thinking means: letting- lie-before-us and so taking-to-heart also beings in being: Thinking so structured pervades the foundation of metaphysics, the duality of beings and Being. Such thinking develops its various successive positions on this foundation and determines the fundamental positions of metaphysics.²⁹

Curiously Heidegger does not consider these remarks as proper answer to the question for it only heightens the problematic of the question of

²⁸ See *What is Called Thinking*, pp. 18ff.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

thinking. What is implied in these remarks is that we are always speaking within the domain of duality. When we utter ‘Being’ it means ‘Being of beings’ and when we say ‘beings; it means ‘beings in relation to Being’. Here it will not be out of place to mention a fundamental notion of Heidegger in evoking ‘ontological difference’ that exists between an entity or for that matter anything that is and the being of an entity. The being of an entity is the meaningful presence of that entity within the horizon of human experience. Contra-distinguishably ‘Being’ has to do with what I might call the ‘is-ness’ thereby implying what an entity is, how it is, and the facticity of that entity being there at all. And this duality, Heidegger contends, is always a prior datum for Parmenides, Plato, Kant and Nietzsche.³⁰ To understand the depth of this pre-given duality, being-Being, Heidegger takes us to the Greek thinkers, especially Parmenides. Translating the fragment 5 of Parmenides, Heidegger says: ‘For it is same thing to think and to be’.³¹ And further investigating the Greek root of the word ‘thinking’ Heidegger contends that ‘thinking’ originally means ‘thanking’ and further it means memory, thinking that recalls, thinking that is thanking. In his own words:

“[T]he essential nature of thinking is determined by what here is to be thought about: the presence of what is present, the Being of beings. Thinking is thanking only when it recalls in thought the Being, That which this word indicates properly and truly, that is, unspoken, tacitly. And that is the duality of beings and Being. This quality is what properly gives food for thought. And what is so given, is the gift of what is most worthy of question.”³²

The Overcoming of Philosophy: Meditative Thinking Woven into *Alêtheia*

Perhaps it is this centri-petality and centri-fugality of thinking about

³⁰ Ibid., p. 227.

³¹ Ibid., p. 240.

³² Ibid., p. 246.

thinking that Heidegger celebrates when he famously asserted:

1. Three dangers threaten thinking.
2. The good and thus wholesome danger is the nighness of the singing poet.
3. The evil and thus keenest danger is thinking itself. It must think against itself, which it can only seldom do.
4. The bad and thus muddled danger is philosophizing.³³

Here one should be very attentive to the above and similar cryptic, ‘hidden’ remarks of Heidegger lest he/she goes astray in reading them. For one could possibly and even justifiably argue that even the very possibility of such a non-metaphysical thinking which is non-calculative, non-conceptual and non-instrumental primarily aimed at overcoming speculative philosophy does have its own premise as a certain kind of metaphysics. Interestingly Heidegger did pre-empt this problem when he said that “a regard for metaphysics still prevails even in the intention to overcome metaphysics.”³⁴ In his engagement with Nietzsche’s thought world, Heidegger goes a step further and says that a ‘trace’ of metaphysical thinking will remain and form a world of genuine, meditative thinking³⁵. But is not entertaining such a thought contrarian, one might justifiably ask. I think here one can profitably take to the conceptual contours of the Greek term *alêtheia* employed creatively by Heidegger to solve this problem. Commenting on Parmenides, Heidegger elucidates the meaning and significance of *alêtheia* as ‘unconcealment’ in a detailed manner and says that “we must think *alêtheia*, unconcealment, as the opening which first grants

³³ Martin Heidegger (2001) (1975), ‘The Thinker as Poet’ in *Poetry, Language, Thought* trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York, Harper Perennial Modern Classics, p. 8.

³⁴ Martin Heidegger (1972) (1964), *On Time and Being*. Trans. J. Stambaugh. London, Harper & Row, p.24.

³⁵ Martin Heidegger (1984) (1961). *Nietzsche III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics*. Ed. David Farrell Krell. San Francisco, Harper San Francisco, p.4

Being and thinking and their presencing to and for each other.”³⁶ To my mind, this shows that such a non-binary meditative thinking is woven into the very fabric of *alêtheia*.

Is it not such a meditative thinking almost impossible for the humans? one might ponder over and ask here. Despite the dense and often convoluted ways of explicating every conceivable nuance of this new way of thinking, Heidegger makes it look very easy when he says that anyone can follow this path of meditative thinking in his/her own way within the confines of his/her limits for the simple reason that “man is a *thinking*, that is, a *meditating* being. ...It is enough if we dwell on what lies close and meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, ... here and now ... now in the present hour of history.”³⁷

Concluding Remarks

In titling these reflections as ‘Thinking about Thinking: *After* Heidegger’, my rather limited purpose was to engage the very foundational task of ‘thinking about thinking’ by attending very carefully to what I call the Heideggerian hermeneutic play that makes such a thinking a possibility. And the use of the italicized preposition ‘After’ meant not merely a chronological or sequential reflection but rather a critical, non-linear and most importantly a *kairological* wayfaring on the pathways trodden by Heidegger but not limited to a particular time or place. Being aware of the profoundly complex and very often convoluted writings of Heidegger, I did this by focusing my attention to some of the relevant writings of Heidegger. In one of his pithy, axiomatic and revelatory mediations, Heidegger has this to say: “To think is to confine yourself to a single thought that one day stands like a star in the world’s sky.”³⁸

³⁶ Martin Heidegger (1972), “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” in Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, p.70.

³⁷ Martin Heidegger (1966), *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. John M. Anderson & E. Hans Freund. New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, p.47.

³⁸ Martin Heidegger (2001) (1971), ‘The Thinker As Poet’ in Heidegger, *Poetry, Language and Thought*, p. 4.

The very singular thought that has engaged our minds thus far has been
'Thinking about thinking: *After* Heidegger'.³⁹

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³⁹ I remain grateful to Professor V.C. Thomas for having invited me to contribute this paper to the Journal *Cetana*. An earlier version of this paper was presented in the Conference on 'Life-World and Consciousness' organized by the Centre for Phenomenological Studies and held at Loyola College, Chennai, March 03-05, 2016.

